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An Introduction to Epistemological Difficulty 
 
 
Un sens trop précis rature 
Ta vague littérature1 
 
 
In his essay, On Difficulty, George Steiner outlines four types of difficulty that a 
reader might stumble upon within a literary text. The first of these he dubs “contingent” 
or “epiphenomenal” difficulty. This is a difficulty that is probably most synonymous with 
the conventional sense of the term and signifies that there is a missing, yet ultimately 
accessible, piece of information that must be sought to furnish the meaning of a text. The 
clearest example of this would be a text in which a reader must look up something—a 
term, a word, a historical or cultural reference that is unknown to he or she—in order to 
piece together the logic of the work.  
The second difficulty that the critic attempts to classify lies not within any 
empirical or semantic obstructions inherent in the text, but rather with the reader’s 
response—or rather his inability to respond positively to the text. When there remain no 
difficulties to be looked up, and yet the reader still feels himself unable to access the 
deeper signification of the text, this is said to be a “modal” difficulty. 
A third class of difficulty, according to Steiner’s taxonomy is “tactical” difficulty. 
That is, in effect, a dissonance between the intention of an author or of a work and the 
linguistic means that presents such an intention and might be seen as a kind of syntactical 
difficulty. The purpose of such stylistic impediments varies, yet the fundamental effects, 
                                                        
1
 Mallarmé, Stephane. Plusieurs Sonnets. N.p.: n.p., 1887. Print. 
(A meaning too precise/crosses out your vague literature) 
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for our purposes, should be noted as the desire to dislodge the reader, and language itself, 
from the stagnation and devaluation of everyday language and syntax. 
However, it is the fourth category of difficulty that Steiner presents—deemed 
“ontological”—that is perhaps most relevant to the diachrony associated with the poetics 
of modern literature that I intend to address. If the first three modes of difficulty take part 
in a “contract of ultimate or preponderant intelligibility between poet and reader, between 
text and meaning,”2 as Steiner suggests, then this fourth stratum of difficulty puts these 
concordances in question, placing them under the scrutiny of epistemological questions 
about language and its communicative values. Some of the key points of this type of 
difficulty are that it seems, at least in part, to be inspired by an increasingly solipsistic 
and closed-off sense of language,“ a private ideal of communication”3 and a lack of faith 
in language to portray the intimate singularity of human feeling. In situating the term, 
Steiner invokes the idea of “ [an] ancient trope of inadequate discourse, the conceit 
whereby words fall short of the unique immediacies of individual experience.”4 
In a sense, the implication of a literature that has been exposed to this class of 
difficulty is also the self-reflexivity of a language that questions its own ability to 
signify—to penetrate through a shroud of linguistic solipsism and deliver its message to a 
reader. Though Steiner refers broadly to the school of modern poetry, (he uses Paul 
Celan’s Largo to exemplify this concept), it is equally within the narratives of Kafka, 
Proust, James and other modern novelists that at an intra-textual dialogue is presented by 
                                                        
2
 Steiner, George. On Difficulty and Other Essays. United States: Oxford University Press, 1978. N. P.40. 
Print. 
 
3
 Steiner, George. On Difficulty and Other Essays. United States: Oxford University Press, 1978. N. P.42. 
Print. 
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virtue of this conundrum (that of ontological difficulty): A literature that uses the very 
linguistic means it condemns to essay an uncertain and often uneasy signification.  
Yet before we deal with representations of ontological—or to simplify Steiner’s 
term, epistemological difficulty—within the narratives of Kafka, Proust and other 
moderns, it is important to note that an author’s skepticism about the effectiveness of 
linguistic conveyance was by no means a novelty by the twentieth century. In fact, it is 
this cynical viewpoint that was the major premise of a literary movement within the late 
19th and early 20th century, that has come to be known in German as Sprachkrise (or in 
some circles, Sprachskepsis)—or, in English, “language crisis.” The early intimations of 
the Sprachkrise that shook the foundations of realism and in many ways shaped the 
(epistemologically minded) negativity that is a trademark of modernism, can be traced to 
numerous literary works produced by German and Viennese authors such Rainer Maria 
Rilke and Stefan George. Yet, perhaps the most notable example is Hugo van 
Hofmannsthal’s Letter to Lord Chandos. Written in 1902, this fictive letter recounts the 
crisis of a Viennese aristocrat and his subsequent withdrawal from literary society. 
Shaken by a bout of solipsism, Chandos has lost all faith in language and laments its 
inability to capture the essential qualities that compose a hitherto vaulted inner-world.  
For it is, indeed, something entirely unnamed, even barely nameable 
which, at such moments, reveals itself to me, filling like a vessel any 
casual object of my daily surroundings with an overflowing flood of 
higher life.5 
 
In some senses, these unnamable, unsayable elements are the stuff—the subject and 
substance—of modernism. Arriving on the heels of a trend in 19th Century European 
                                                        
5
 Hugo, Von Hofmannsthal. Letter to Lord Chandos. N.p.: n.p., 1902. Print. 
 
 6 
Realism that embraced an objective sense of language in order to depict an exterior and 
material world as it is, unobstructed by human emotion and the subjectivity of authorial 
overtones, modern literature moves in quite the opposite direction—that is, inward. 
Certainly in Proust we see what might be dubbed the fathoming of cloistered vaults of 
human consciousness. And although Proust is, perhaps, one of the more optimistic 
moderns when it comes to capturing this inner world and its unique essence(s), there soon 
comes to the surface of this genus of literature a plethora of questions and an abundance 
of skepticism surrounding the ability of language (a purportedly objective communicative 
mode) to capture for the author, and subsequently to relate to his reader, a subject that is 
so inherently singular and subjective. With this view, we return to Steiner’s concept of: 
“the ancient trope of inadequate discourse,” and the commonality of language that 
renders it a poor vessel for the transmission of an expression that is necessarily personal 
and “unique.” 
Yet, one might note that Hofmannsthal’s work is not itself an example of 
ontological difficulty, though it does seem to be addressing what is perhaps, the major 
cause of such an epistemologically minded literary phenomenon. Thus, despite the fact 
that its core subject seems to be a paralytic and linguistic problem that underlies the 
transubstantiation of human experience into language, it is actually a remarkably clear 
and poignant piece of literature that displays hardly any of the tropes of difficulty that we 
have previously discussed (apart from a handful of possible contingent difficulties). 
Alternatively, the works that I intend to address do more than just address this 
epistemological issue at a surface level. In a sense, it is these works written by later 
moderns—including several of Kafka’s novels and parables, sections of Proust’s In 
 7 
Search of Lost Time, and even Henry James’s Turn of the Screw—that delve into the 
ontological difficulty of the 20th century’s Sprachkrise, presenting and, in a typically 
Derridean sense, enacting hermeneutical and linguistic allegories of the interpretative 
process (and really, what amounts to the impossibility) of critical reading. 
Still, it might be helpful to provide more context before introducing these modern 
allegories. Even before Hofmannsthal’s modernist manifesto, poets like Mallarmé, 
Valéry and later, Paul Celan made early contributions to an increasingly palpable sense of 
linguistic difficulty in their notoriously difficult poetry that seems to put both the function 
of language and its limits into question. Unlike Hofmannsthal, who has clearly not 
forgone the utilitarian value of language, as demonstrated (rather effectively and, in this 
sense, paradoxically) in his solipsistic lamentations, Mallarmé eschews the semantic 
wealth of language in favor of its pure, sonorous aestheticism. It might be said that these 
early poets occupy an extreme endpoint of a tension between the established 
communicative powers of language (as perhaps inflated by preceding Enlightenment 
ideals) and the mendacious arbitrariness of verbal-linguistic referents—from a semiotic 
standpoint, the discrepancy between signifier and signified (“das Schreiben ist Hilflos”6).  
Yet, while the latter is a motif for Kafka, it is the law of Mallarmé’s prose and 
poetry. Thus one might remark that, while the French poet appears to distance himself 
from any intimations of verbal utility, Kafka does not withdraw entirely from this world. 
Like Proust and James, Kafka engages this fundamental breakdown of linguistic certainty 
by means of narrative discourse—one that does partake in the communicative powers of 
language, but not by any traditional or easily intelligible means. As I have previously 
                                                        
6
 Kafka, Franz. Über das Schreiben. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983. P.150. Print. 
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suggested, it is most notably through the rhetorical implications of a set of convoluted 
and rather difficult allegories that this modern argument about language and its uncertain 
significative potential might be teased out. While, James and Proust are supplementary to 
this discussion of emerging expressive modes, it is with Kafka and his markedly modern 
style—and its failure or success—that I place the burden of this modern meaning. 
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Kafka Takes the Stand 
 
In his compilation of analytical essays, Illuminations, Walter Benjamin ends a 
section on Kafka with the following synopsis of Kafka’s life and work: “ To do justice to 
the figure of Kafka in its purity and its peculiar beauty one must never lose sight of one 
thing: It is the purity and beauty of a failure.”7 Despite the apparent deprecation of this 
summarizing line, there is an undeniable admiration for Kafka’s “peculiar” penchant for 
failure – otherwise what utility could Benjamin have found in dedicating a chapter to the 
abortive writer? Is it possible that so-called failure of Kafka as a writer could constitute a 
worthy subject and, possibly, a worthy end that is sought in Kafka’s writing? 
Alternatively, is it possible that there is something that Benjamin has missed about the 
Czech author’s work that might have led the critic’s inference astray? 
To further untangle this conclusion of Benjamin, we must understand the ways in 
which Kafka might be deemed a failed writer, and furthermore, the ways in which the 
notion of failure permeates the logos and rhetoric of his texts. Many of Kafka’s stories 
remained unfinished when he died, and it is clear enough that this had little to do with the 
author’s laziness or willingness to produce literature. For Kafka there was an undeniable 
sense that the completion of many, if not most of his works, and the signification that 
they strove to attain, were necessarily unachievable and irretrievable. Thus, the leitmotif 
of an “Unrettbar Reden,” translated as “irretrievable8 speech,” comes to pervade almost 
all of his works, appearing often to consume any possibility of exegetical or significative 
clarity that might be unearthed within the absurd semantics and difficult rhetoric of his 
texts. The idea of the irretrievable or the unsayable—that which necessarily cannot be 
                                                        
7
 Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. New York: Random House Inc, 1968. P.121. Print. 
8
 Unrettbar might be more accurately translated as unsalvageable or incapable of salvation—which would 
combine a religious aspect with the clear linguistic connotation. 
 10
transmitted—is certainly problematic for a man like Kafka who, as an author, spent much 
of his life toiling within the shadowy vicissitudes of linguistic semiotics. Yet the 
primordial root of Kafka’s failure, though related to a shortcoming of semiotics that I will 
discuss later, is possibly buried even deeper within the author, below the realm of 
language, writing and communication. Indeed, it might be traced to the most basic level 
of sentient being: namely, consciousness. One might infer that it is this dichotomy 
between the self and the world, and the incompatibility and irreconcilability of the two 
that forges Kafka’s affinity for failure, incoherence, and the impossibility of unity.  
Naturally, the two-fold structure of language is an analogue, and, effectively, a 
mimetic representation of this dichotomy of self-hood. Like consciousness, understood as 
a kind of mirror or spectral reflection of the physical world in which it is ensconced—a 
reality that it strives to appropriate, order and thus obtain for itself—language attempts 
the same process of transmitting meaning and reality between two parties. This, of 
course, is the foundation of semiotics, a system that relies on the ability of a subject or of 
a signifier to retain, and subsequently, to relate a signified. It is within this process and 
the semiotic discrepancy between its two parties that failure in Kafka’s writing is perhaps 
preordained.  
To illustrate this linguistic dilemma and its prominence in Kafka’s works, we 
might look to The Departure as an introductory example. 
I ORDERED my horse to be brought from the stables. The servant did not 
understand my orders. So I went to the stables myself, saddled my horse, 
and mounted. In the distance I heard the sound of a trumpet, and I asked 
the servant what it meant. He knew nothing and had heard nothing. At the 
gate he stopped me and asked: where is the master going?” I don’t know,” 
I said, “just out of here, just out of here. Out of here, nothing else, it’s the 
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only way I can reach my goal.” “So you know your goal?” he asked. 
“Yes,” I replied, “I’ve just told you. Out of here – that’s my goal.”9 
 
The foremost attribute of the text is a communicative breakdown and, as viewed through 
the lens of a literary theorist, a fundamental failure of semiotic structures. The 
significative fissures are noted first in the firm imperative,“ ‘I ORDERED my 
horse’…The servant did not understand” and, subsequently, in an interrogative demand, 
“I asked the servant what it meant?... ‘He knew nothing.’ ” Both attempts at 
communicative discourse between the pair reveal a profound and irresolvable 
misunderstanding and the concomitant conveyance is lost between them. To add to the 
apparent confusion of the passage, the sounding of the trumpet—a non-semantic cue with 
an inherently elusive signification—joins in this breakdown of signs. 
 Understood as a linguistic allegory, this story would provide some insight into the 
author’s apparent aims, and might lend itself as a paradigm for comprehensibility and 
overarching rhetorical structures within Kafka’s parables. What seems to be outlined in 
the tale is a kind of austere linguistic asceticism, at least on a semantic level—the 
indication being that a literal reading of the tale will be of little use to his reader and his 
interpretative exegesis of the text. The narrator relates: “…the servant didn’t understand 
my orders. So I went to the stables myself, saddled my horse and mounted.” The textual 
realm in which the narrator makes his home (though he appears as an outsider to this 
world) is one that appears cold and dead; the servant, particularly, seems to be an emblem 
of a world that is largely deaf and dumb to him. In a sense, this world represents the fixity 
and stasis of written word, estranged from its author and his deducible motives—a 
                                                        
9
 Kafka, Franz. The Complete Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. New York: Schocken Books Inc., 
1971. P.449. Print. 
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dominion and a predicament that Kafka, as the author of the text, shares with this 
narrator. 
The culminating suggestion of communicative failure between the master and 
servant comes with the recognition that the latter will receive no help from the servant 
and the linguistic possibilities that are negated by his supposed subordinate’s lack of 
cooperation. Sharpening this allegory to a point, we might infer, specifically, that the 
servant is metonymic for direct (literal) semantic value of which Kafka’s writing is 
bereft.10 The problem with semantic communication, it would seem (apart from the 
general representative idolatry and inadequacy of semiotic transmission), is that it is a 
system based on both communal and fixed assumptions, and thus excludes the possibility 
of singular expression. Thus, the narrator’s turning away from this primary function of 
linguistic conveyance, as perhaps intimated by his emphatic insistence on making his 
way “out of here,” suggests that meaning in Kafka’s stories might instead be limited to 
the latently rhetorical and the symbolic.11  
An alternate version of the Parable, titled instead, My Destination, further 
suggests this possibility: 
“You have no provisions with you,” he said. “I need none,” I said, “the 
journey is so long that I must die of hunger if I don’t get anything on the 
way. No provisions can save [retten] me. For it is, fortunately, a truly 
immense [ungeheures] journey.” 
 
The linguistic austerity in this reworking of the parable is echoed by the master’s lack of 
provisions, his insistence upon starvation.12 The use of retten—which insinuates the trope 
of Unrettbar Reden—seems indeed to suggest that language, at least in its literal form, 
                                                        
10
 Assuming that the essential signification of the story is not simply: a man wants to leave his stable. 
 
12
 The Hunger Artist too seems to be another example of equating starvation with the author’s circumspect 
linguistic inclinations. 
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cannot be the means of the master’s salvation, nor can it be the instrument for the 
conveyance of the text’s underlying meaning.  
As this example suggests, Kafka’s discussion of language in his narratives—as a 
rule—is never explicit. Just as the author’s motives are obscured, any meaningful, direct, 
semantic signification seems nonexistent; instead, his ruminations on linguistics—and 
possibly on the value of his own authorship—are staged in the guise of narrative and 
veiled within a wealth of allegory, a system that is well suited to Kafka’s typical narrative 
mode and that might best be described as a kind of non-didactic parable. This is to say, it 
has all the allegorical potency of a religious or otherwise instructive parable, yet lacks the 
immediate accessibility and hermeneutical clarity of an edifying message.  
We might take another short story, An Imperial Message, as an example. In this 
parable, an emperor has summoned a messenger to carry a personal message to “you, the 
humble subject, the insignificant shadow, cowering in the remotest distance before the 
imperial sun.” If we are to view the emperor as a possible analogue to Kafka as the 
author, then his “humble subject [Untertanen]”13 is his reader. This German word, 
Untertanen, is defined as sort of historical subject—an object of discourse. The 
suggestion here may be that, at one level, Kafka’s text is examining the reader and his 
relation to a text. Returning to this potential allegory, the job of the messenger—with 
whom the burden of communication, of acquainting our subject with an object, or from a 
semiotic standpoint a signified—might be reserved for language.  
                                                        
13
 Kafka, Franz. The Complete Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. New York: Schocken Books Inc., 
1971. P.4. Print. 
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  Despite the messenger’s initial bravado (“a powerful, indefatigable 
man…cleaves a way for himself through the throng”), he will ultimately be unable to 
accomplish his task: 
The multitudes are so vast; their numbers have no end…how vainly does 
he wear out his strength; still he is only making his way through the 
chambers of the innermost palace; never will he get to the end of them.14 
 
 Just as the messenger of the parable cannot deliver his message, there echoes an 
allegorical implication that perhaps Kafka, as the author of the text, is ambivalent about 
his own ability to communicate with his reader and possibly, unsure of the value of his 
own body of writings. Certainly the latter would be supported by Kafka’s insistence that 
most of his unpublished writings be burned upon his death. Regardless, the incessant 
vacillation of his texts are a reminder of linguistic uncertainty and the general doubt that 
pervades almost all of his works. The author’s peripatetic turn that we have seen above, 
one that is typical of Kafka’s prose, is insistent upon writing as a dialectical signifier and, 
in turn, reading as a dialectical experience.  If at one moment he confides in language; in 
the next, he will negate what trust has been established. 
 This dialectical pattern may is demonstrated in another of Kafka’s parables, The 
Trees. 
For we are like tree trunks in the snow. In appearance they lie sleekly and 
a little push should be enough to set them rolling. No, it can’t be done, for 
they are firmly wedded to the ground. But see, even that is only 
appearance.15 
 
                                                        
14
 Kafka, Franz. The Complete Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. New York: Schocken Books Inc., 
1971. P.5. Print. 
15
 Kafka, Franz. The Complete Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. New York: Schocken Books Inc., 
1971. P.382. Print. 
 
 15
The subject of this first sentence, a first person plural, may appear ambiguous. Yet to the 
reader who is familiar with Kafka there looms tacitly an impression that “we”might refer 
to the words of the text, speaking for themselves (La parole qui a la parole pour lui-
même). If this is the case, the allegorical significance of this shorter short story becomes 
illuminated; it is a dialectical commentary on language, addressed to us by language 
itself.  But far more than just a dialectical commentary on language, what we may have 
here is the portrayal of language—and the transmission of its meaning—as a dialectic. On 
one hand, “like trunks in the snow…firmly wedded to the ground” language has the 
capacity to be taken entirely literal—to have a rigidly fixed and objective meaning. Yet, 
with the turn of the dialectic, “a little push should be enough to set them rolling,” we 
discern a sense of the fluidity and movement of inference. If this “little push” could be 
the effect of the reader who interprets the tale, and so galvanizes its signification into life, 
then there is inherently the implication that his reading of the text is of a subjective nature 
almost like the Rorschach tests used by psychologists on their patients. This possibility 
would equally implicate language as having an inherently polysemic potential—that is, it 
is capable of having plural significations, each individual to the reader of the text.  
The latter view of this relationship between text and reader is particularly 
conducive to the use of allegory, which insists on a degree of separation between 
language and a literal interpretation. It is interesting to consider that Kafka’s penchant for 
parabolic writings, with all their reliance on allegory, may be related to his ruminations 
on the rhetorical possibilities of language. Typical of Kafka’s penchant for oscillation, he 
steps back from this seemingly optimistic possibility, with the resigned line, “No it can’t 
be done,” only to change his mind again with the final line: “But see, even that is only 
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appearance.” It seems to be this the movement involved in the reciprocity of these two 
entities—the rigid authority of the text and the catalytic and dynamic glance of the 
interpreter—that drives the thrust of Kafka’s hermeneutical argument.  
 Another of Kafka’s parables that seems to deal with sort of dialectic of fluid and 
fixed meaning is A Little Fable. In the following text, Kafka sets up what might be 
described as a kind of hermeneutical trap: 
 “ALAS,” said the mouse, “the world is growing smaller every day. At the 
beginning it was so big that I was afraid, I kept running and running, and I 
was glad when at last I saw walls far away to the right and left, but these 
long walls have narrowed so quickly that I am in the last chamber already, 
and there in the corner stand the trap that I must run into.” You only need 
to change your direction,” said the cat, and ate it up.16 
 
Read as an allegory, the narrowing walls that enclose the mouse seem to be synonymous 
with the reduction of the plural possible significations inherent in metaphor. To run into 
the “trap” might be equated with the misguided (and in the mouse’s case, fatal) act of 
reducing Kafka’s decidedly ambiguous and plural language, to a single, objective and 
fixed signification. The solution that is revealed at the end of the parable is simply “to 
change your direction.” With this revelation a dialectical possibility of language seems to 
be uncovered.  
When we consider many of Kafka’s longer and more famous parables, this 
possibility of pluralistically inclined language seems to resurface in a much more tangible 
sense. Take the ending of An Imperial Message, where we might decrypt a latent 
discussion of the author’s unusual and complex rhetoric, encoded, as usual, in terms of 
allegory: 
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 Kafka, Franz. The Complete Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. New York: Schocken Books Inc., 
1971. P.445. Print. 
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…still he is only making his way through the chambers of the innermost 
palace; never will he get to the end of them; and if he succeeded in that 
nothing would be gained; he must next fight his way down the stair; and if 
he succeeded in that nothing would be gained; the courts would still have 
to be crossed ; and after the courts the second outer palace; and once more 
stairs and courts; and once more another palace…and if at last he should 
burst through the outermost gate – but never, never can that happen – the 
imperial capital would lie before him, the center of the world, crammed to 
bursting with its own sediment. Nobody could fight his way through here 
even with a message from a dead man.17 
 
The purportedly endless journey from the inner palace to the outer palace to the courts 
and so on seems to suggest a sort of mise en abyme structure – an infinitely refracting 
series of congruous obstacles that prevent the messenger from carrying the word of the 
emperor to the outside world. This can be read as a comment on the author’s own 
convoluted language, the impenetrability of his allegory but also the multiplicity of its 
layers and potential interpretations. It is the ambiguity denoted by literal status of Kafka’s 
semantics that frustrate the reader’s efforts to extract any fixed or definite signification 
from his story. Given its subject (Untertanen), the text clearly deals with issues of 
transmission, yet it is the details of this transmission that have been obscured by the text’s 
parabolic polysemy. The semantic surfaces of the text—an emperor sending a message— 
allegorically point to the process of reading, which in turn reflects back on the process of 
writing. In this allegorical movement, everything spirals endlessly inwards towards the 
abyssal and unreachable dichotomy of consciousness, as the author plumbs the depths of 
an ever-alluring but inevitably unfathomable signification. 
In this sense, Kafka’s writing is a world that is “crammed, bursting with its own 
sediment [Bodensatz]”—a term that seems to be referring to these half-empty rhetorical 
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 Kafka, Franz. The Complete Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. New York: Schocken Books Inc., 
1971. P.5. Print. 
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structures that continually circumscribe and thus facilitate an endless approach to the 
ever-elusive meaning of the text. It is the apparent plurality of the text’s allegorical 
suggestions that denote the text’s ambiguity and complicates his reader’s interpretative 
efforts. This is the difficulty inherent in the unremitting movement of Kafka’s dialectical 
writing—a difficulty that seems to prompt the penultimate line of the text: “Nobody 
could fight his way through here even with a message from a dead man.”18 
Yet, the question remains whether this plurality of signification can succeed in 
achieving a fuller, more meaningful text for Kafka, or whether it is simply an impediment 
to meaning. [quote on Begley, Indeed…] The closing sentence of the parable might 
suggest a kind of redemption for this kind of language that relies not on the rigidity of the 
author’s motives, but instead on the fluidity of the readers’ inferences. In their popular 
translation, Kafka: The Complete Stories, Willa and Edwin Muir render this last sentence 
in English as follows: “But you sit at your window when evening falls and dream it to 
yourself.” This translation may fall short of the original German in that the verb used by 
Kafka, erträumen, translated as dream, has another meaning built into it that is not 
encompassed by its English counterpart. The meaning of erträumen is both to dream and 
something like “to fantasize” or “to make up.” If we consider this latter connotation of 
the verb—a polysemy in itself, which could be seen as enacting an argument on behalf of 
interpretative polysemy—the last two lines could be read as something like: “Nobody 
could fight his way through here even with a message from a dead man. But you sit at 
your window when evening falls and fabricate it for yourself [erträumst sie dir].” In this 
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 Kafka, Franz. The Complete Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. New York: Schocken Books Inc., 
1971. P.5. Print. 
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reading, the plurality of language becomes not an impediment to the author’s work or a 
harbinger of failure, but the very crux of the work and the emancipating—and even 
beautiful—potential of language that the author means to capture in his text. Like the 
“trees in the snow,” it is this act of critical interpretation that sets the work “rolling.” 
 With a linguistic allegory in mind—one that concerns the general act of 
transmission, whether between word and referent, or between a text/author and reader—
we might now turn to Kafka’s Before the Law, the parable that appears near the end of 
Kafka’s novel, The Trial. 
Before the law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there comes a man from 
the country and prays for admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he 
cannot grant admittance at the moment. The man thinks it over and then asks if 
he will be allowed in later. “It is possible,” says the doorkeeper, “but not at the 
moment.” Since the gate stands open, as usual, and the doorkeeper steps to one 
side, the man stoops to peer through the gateway into the interior. Observing that, 
the doorkeeper laughs and says: “If you are so drawn to it, just try to go in 
despite my veto. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the least of 
doorkeepers. From hall to hall there is one doorkeeper after another, each more 
powerful than the last. The third doorkeeper is already so terrible that I cannot 
bear to look at him.” These are difficulties the man from the country had not 
expected; the Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all times and to 
everyone, but as he now takes a closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, with 
his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard, he decides to that it is better 
to wait until he gets permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives him a stool and 
lets him and lets him sit down at one side of the door. There he sits for days and 
years. He makes many attempts to be admitted, and wearies the doorkeeper by 
his importunity. The doorkeeper frequently has little interviews with him, asking 
him questions about his home and many other things, but the questions are all put 
indifferently, as great lords put them, and always finish with the statement that he 
cannot be let in yet. The man, who has furnished himself with many things for 
his journey, sacrifices all he has, however valuable, to bribe the doorkeeper. The 
doorkeeper accepts everything, but always with the remark: “I am only taking it 
to keep you from thinking you have omitted anything.” During these years the 
man fixes his attention almost continuously on the doorkeeper. He forgets the 
other doorkeepers, and this first one seems to him the sole obstacle preventing 
access to the Law. He curses his bad lick, in his early years boldly and loudly; 
later, as he grows old, he only grumbles to himself. He becomes childish, and 
since his yearlong contemplation of the doorkeeper he has come to know even 
the fleas in his fur collar. He begs the fleas as well to help him and to change the 
doorkeeper’s mind. At length his eyesight begins to fail and he does not know 
whether the world is really darker or whether his eyes are only deceiving him. 
Yet in his darkness he is now aware of a radiance that streams inextinguishably 
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from the gateway of the Law. Now he has not very long to live. Before he dies, 
all his experiences in these long years gather themselves in his head to one point, 
a question he has not yet asked the doorkeeper. He waves him nearer, since he 
can no longer raise his stiffening body. The doorkeeper has to bend low toward 
him, for the difference in height between them has much altered to the man’s 
disadvantage. “What do you want to know now?” asks the doorkeeper; “you are 
insatiable.” “Everyone strives to reach the Law,” says the man, “so how does it 
happen that for all these many years no one but myself has ever begged fro 
admittance?” The doorkeeper recognizes that the man has reached his end, and, 
to let his failing senses catch the words, roars [brüllt] in his ear: “No one else 
could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. “I am now 
going to shut it.”19 
 
What is at stake in Kafka’s fable is epistemological or, perhaps more precisely, 
hermeneutical certainty and, as in An Imperial Message, the odds seem rather stacked 
against it. Like the reader of a text, the man approaches the gateway to the Law expecting 
admittance to it. Denied, the man is merely spurred on by his failure. He plies the 
Doorkeeper with a series of questions proceeding in logical fashion. Ultimately, they will 
be to no avail as each attempt is met continually with the programmed response of the 
doorkeeper that “he cannot be let in yet”—an answer given with all the fixity of textual 
inscription, as if to suggest an allegory of textual exegesis. The root of this failure of the 
man to be admitted, however, should not be attributed to the soundness of the logic he 
employs; instead it seems to be a condition of interpretative or perhaps linguistic deferral 
that is central to this text—one that is related to the mise en abyme structure that we have 
observed in An Imperial Message and that seems to both elicit and eclipse the primary 
signification of Before The Law.  
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 To better approach these notions, we must consider the general topography of an 
allegory of reading within the text.20 In order to lend coherence to a linguistic or 
hermeneutical allegory, it is necessary also to situate the relation of the doorkeeper and to 
both the Law and the man seeking entry to it. He responds to the traveller’s pleas but only 
with the indifference of “great lords.” His “long, thin black Tartar beard” tells of age, 
perhaps, suggesting the longevity and posterity of textual and literary mediums. 
Additionally, at the end of the story, as the man has grown old, “The doorkeeper has to 
bend low toward him, for the difference in height between them has much altered to the 
man’s disadvantage,” while the doorkeeper is immune to the ravaging effects of time and, 
thus, purports a posthumous authority that outlives its author, literally (textually), in the 
fixity of its inscription. (Bearing this in mind, one might recall the penultimate line of An 
Imperial Message: “Nobody could fight his way through here, even with a message from 
a dead man.”) 
 Like the authority figure of the emperor (and his message), authorial certainty of 
the Law is barred from Kafka’s reader. It is in this sense that the ontological difficulty 
that Steiner defines is the very condition of these writings.  If the doorkeeper were, in 
fact, the impasse that prevents the man from knowing the Law, he is also the guarantor of 
this difficulty in the text. As such, he should be equated with the obscurity of Kafka’s 
impenetrable rhetoric and its illusory significations. In other words, he can be seen as 
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representing Kafka’s language in his position as mediator between the author’s intentions 
and the reader’s interpretative capacity.  
The Tartar beard equally seems to link the doorkeeper to a sort of mystic defiance 
of Western thought, suggesting perhaps Kafka’s skepticism about the optimism and the 
possibility of certainty posited by Enlightenment ideas. But, as Derrida remarks, the 
relation of the doorkeeper to the law seems, on first inspection, to mirror Kant’s 
categorical imperative,21 which would call for the subordination of the individual to the 
universal. If the assumption of Kant’s philosophical standpoint holds true, then the 
singular should provide access to the universal; just as we expect a text to yield an 
essential truth, the man expects to be granted admittance to the Law. 
Yet, in Before the Law this is not the case. The stick that has been tossed in the 
spokes of Kantian hermeneutics is what Derrida terms Différance—or the act of deferral. 
This is the import of the doorkeeper who responds always, “It is possible but not at the 
moment,” neither denying nor admitting the man but merely frustrating and, thus, 
extending his logical pursuit of the Law. However, it is with the final revelation of the 
text, “No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you,” 
that the Kantian paradigm of the singular that yields access to the general is turned on its 
head. If the gateway to the Law (the universal) is different for every man, then the 
universal is instead subordinated to the individual. The resulting logical paradox in which 
subjectivity dominates any possibility of the absolute, the objective or the universal is 
enacted as the man is denied admittance to the law. What we have, then, is the inversion 
of the customary relation between reader and text. It is no longer simply the reader who 
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analyzes the text, but what might be called a negotiation between the objectivity of the 
latter and the subjective import of the former.  
 According to Derrida’s theory, it is the différance of the text – the deferral of any 
climax or resolution within the text—that is the source of this realignment in the relation 
between text and reader. If the door to the law is made “only for you”—that is to say, it is 
inherently singular—then the Law the man seeks is also of a singular and personal nature. 
Thus, from a literary theorist’s perspective, any attempt at deriving the Law is no longer 
akin to deriving a signified from a signifier (as is the norm within linguistic or semiotic 
structures), but is instead a question of two signifiers that are placed in opposition (abime 
and contre-abime), both of which look to the other to furnish their own meaning in a 
process of endless refraction and deferral. The result, as Derrida suggests, is a mise en 
abyme—an endless and impenetrable circularity of logic and a digressive obsession with 
minutiae: “Since his yearlong contemplation of the doorkeeper he has come to know even 
the fleas in his fur collar.” All the same, this spectral process, as understood by Derrida, 
is one of marked and endless futility; it will not bring the man any closer to 
understanding or reaching “the law.” Yet, there remains the issue of the “radiance” 
perceived by the man as he nears the end of his sojourn, which would suggest that 
perhaps there exists some sort of redemption for meaning outside the pessimism and 
significative nullification that is entailed by Derrida’s différance jusqu’au mort. 
 Part of the genius of Kafka’s work is that the process of différance that is seen as 
the man from the country attempts to reason his way into the Law is repeated by Kafka’s 
reader himself, who is forced to attempt a similar process of hermeneutical process in 
gauging the meaning of the parable. Like the man before the Law, the critic who combs 
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the minute details of the text might equally be stumped. This experience is captured in 
David Foster’s Wallace’s remarks on Kafka, which echo the latter author’s imagery from 
Before the Law.  
You can…imagine his art as a kind of door. To envision us readers 
coming up and pounding on this door, pounding and pounding, not just 
wanting admission but needing it, we don't know what it is but we can feel 
it, this total desperation to enter, pounding and pushing and kicking, etc. 
That, finally, the door opens ... and it opens outward: we've been inside 
what we wanted all along.22 
 
The indication of the last line of Wallace’s comments appears to suggest exactly the 
inversion of the traditionally assumed relationship between text and reader that we have 
just discussed (“this door was made only for you”). Furthermore, Wallace’s comments 
elucidate the way in which this inversion anticipates the reader and his critical 
deconstruction of the text.  
Kafka too seems to be aware of this effect of the text, as he slyly inserts the 
parable into his novel, The Trial, rendering the parable—itself an exercise in 
hermeneutics—an object of textual exegesis. The effect of this interweaving and 
juxtaposition of texts, convoluted like its explanation, being a second degree (mimicking 
the relation of the man from the country to the Law) of placing in opposition of abime 
and contre-abime – a relation that bears the semblance of the primordial linguistic 
relation of signifier and signified yet plays on the notion of a signifier that it is faced only 
with another signifier and thus the refraction of itself—again, an effective mise en abyme 
and the root of Derrida’s “différance.” The ostensible output of this relationship is a sort 
of self-reflexive rhetorical demonstration of an intertexual dialogue (the meanings of the 
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two texts seem to fuse into one another) imbued by the proximity – literally the context of 
the works. And in this sense, then, the reader of The Trial—as Wallace’s remarks 
suggest— represents a third degree of spectral reflection. He or she becomes an 
interpreter of one interpreter (Joseph K.) of another interpreter (the man from the 
country), resulting in a seemingly endless chain of signifiers.  
 A greater sense of clarity may be found by returning to the second degree of 
interpretation—the scene of textual exegesis in The Trial, which occurs when Joseph K. 
encounters the priest in the cathedral. We may find that this passage is of considerable 
importance in understanding the difficulty of hermeneutics in Kafka’s text and the 
meaning that the author intended his reader to arrive at (the third interpretative degree). 
In presenting the tale, Before the Law, to Joseph K. what the priest seems to suggest are 
the dynamic and dialectal possibilities of interpretation that are inherent in the parable. 
Having told the story, the priest delineates between alternate readings of the parable, 
ascribing to it all the hermeneutical significance of a religious scripture (“I have told you 
the story in the very words of the scriptures.”23). 
The first reading, suggested by Joseph K., maintains that the doorkeeper has 
deceived the man from the country in that he yields “the message of salvation” 24 only 
when it is already too late for the man. Yet the priest is unsatisfied with this reading, 
citing that there is no mention of such deception in the parable and that the two 
statements of the doorkeeper (“that he cannot let the man in at the moment” and “that the 
door was intended only for the man”25), do not in fact contradict one another. He scolds 
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Joseph K. for his hasty inferences: “You have not enough respect for the written word, 
and you are altering the story.”26 The suggestion of this admonishment appears to be that 
the ambiguity inherent in the text cannot be so easily circumvented by inductive 
measures.  
 The priest goes on to suggest an alternative interpretation of the story, one which 
would reverse K.’s previous conclusion, by arguing instead that it is rather the 
doorkeeper who is deceived (“deluded”). The argument for this conclusion is made on the 
premise that the doorkeeper himself has no knowledge of the law and that “his ideas of 
the interior are…childish.”27 For this reason he would come to be seen as subjugated to 
the man from the country: 
…although he is in the service of the Law, his service is confined to this 
one entrance; that is to say, he serves only this man for whom alone the 
entrance is intended. On that ground too he is inferior to the man. One 
must assume that for many years…his service was in a sense an empty 
formality since he had to wait for the man to come.28 
 
With this relationship of subjugation in mind, whether the man is subjugated to the 
doorkeeper of vice versa, it becomes apparent that a commentary on the relation between 
text and reader, which we have previously discussed, may be at play. If the first reading 
of the story, which infers the subjugation of the man to the whims of a deceptive 
doorkeeper, suggests that reader relies wholly on the text’s divulgence of meaning, the 
second would suggest the opposite—that the relationship has been inverted and thus the 
reader generates the meaning of the text (since the doorkeeper—representative of the 
language of the text in this case—has no understanding of the “interior” of the Law).  
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However, it becomes increasingly clear that neither of these interpretations is 
exclusively valid. The priest reminds us that he is merely “showing you [K.] the various 
opinions concerning the point”29 and that “the right perception of any matter and a 
misunderstanding of the same matter do not wholly exclude one another.”30 Thus, the two 
readings of the text together constitute a dialectic concerning the relation of text and 
reader—one that suggests not the inversion of the former (paradigmatic) reading relation, 
but the coexistence of both. In other words, the meaning of the text is neither based 
wholly within the text or the reader inclusively, but it is rather a negotiation of these 
elements. In this composive view, the text may start out as the object of exegesis; but 
within this discursive and dialectical movement, the focus then shifts to the reader, who 
becomes the subject der sich erträumst sie. As the priest has infroms the defendant, “the 
verdict is not suddenly arrived at, the proceedings only gradually merge into the 
verdict.”31  
But Joseph K., like the man seeking entry to the Law in the parable, fails to 
comprehend the priests message. 
“A melancholy conclusion,” said K. “It turns lying into a universal 
principle.” 
K. said that with finality, but it was not his final judgment. He was too 
tired to survey all the conclusions arising from the story, and the trains of 
thought into which it was leading him were unfamiliar, dealing with 
impalpabilities better suited to a theme for discussion among Court 
officials than for him. The simple story had lost its clear outline…the 
priest…now accepted his comment in silence, although undoubtedly he 
did not agree with it.32 
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Joseph K.’s mistake—his inability to understand these “impalpabilities”—is intertwined 
with the very “finality” with which he arrives at his conclusion. In his insistence on 
certainty, Kafka’s protagonist misses the essential argument of the priest that “it is not 
necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary.”33 The truth 
of the text—if it can be deemed as such—cannot come into being as a fixed or finalized 
interpretation; it must arise as a discursive and epistemological understanding of how the 
text is capable of generating different meanings. 
 The question that remains, then, is whether failure is a necessary component of 
the ontological condition of Kafka’s text—if K’s fated failure is necessarily enmeshed 
with the failure of Kafka’s meaning? Or on the other hand, if there is a way to circumvent 
the futility of its paradoxically dynamic nature. Despite the pessimistic conclusions that 
are elaborated in these texts, (this is perhaps a warning flag as rarely is anything that is 
truly meaningful presented clearly in Kafka’s works) there is perhaps still hope for the 
redemption of Kafka and his apparent, even, self-proclaimed failure—but hope of a 
different kind.  
 This possibility is perhaps intimated in yet another of Kafka’s parables. In The 
Vulture, one of his more baffling and enigmatic short stories, a man—presumably an 
authorial figure— is torn to shreds by an unforgiving raptor. 
A VULTURE was hacking at my feet. It had already torn my boots and 
stockings to shreds, now it was hacking at the feet themselves. Again and 
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again it struck at them, then circled several times restlessly around me, 
then returned to continue its work.34 
 
If one’s first inclination is to see the first-person narrator as Kafka himself, besieged by 
the forces conspiring against him, there is another way to approach this story—one that is 
likely to be closer to Kafka’s intent. In this view, the image of the vulture circling its prey 
is akin to the author, or to language that [rhetorically] circumscribes its targeted 
signification. Of course, this is a potent image for Kafka who presents the hermeneutical 
and in some sense, the linguistic pursuit of meaning as a process of asymptotic futility. 
Like the vulture, Kafka’s fiction can be seen as an endless dance around and encircling 
the Unrettbar Reden of the text, employing rhetorical devices that resist any sort of 
certainty of immediate clarity.  
Yet within the final lines of the story, there is a possible resolution to Kafka’s 
abysmal and seemingly fated failure. 
During this conversation the vulture had been calmly listening, letting its 
eye rove between me and the gentlemen. Now I realized that it had 
understood everything; it took wing, leaned far back to gain impetus, and 
then, like a javelin thrower, thrust its beak through my mouth, deep into 
me. Falling back, I was relieved to feel him drowning irretrievably in my 
blood, which was filling every depth, flooding every shore.35 
 
If this passage is read as a kind of redemptive respite, then its signification is necessarily 
two-fold (true to Kafka’s penchant for dialectics). Firstly, it implies the death of the 
authorial figure and asserts the impotence, and the impossibility of signification. And yet, 
the vulture no longer circles its prey in futility; it has finally hit its mark. How can we 
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reconcile these contradicting analyses? The answer comes from a notion that seems to 
pervade the essence of Kafka as a writer, Aufhebung (sublation) – the coupling of thesis 
and anti-thesis. Thus the resolution of the text is possibly that in acknowledging the 
inability of the author to attain the irretrievable and the unfathomable, he has hit upon the 
most potent truth of his text; paradoxically his failure is the very attainment of his goal 
and his ultimate success, amounting to a dialectical signification that captures the 
constant and uncertain movement of a polysemically driven epistemological dialogue.  
 The concept of Aufhebung could also be used to lend a significative coherence to 
Before the Law as well. Due to the apparent wealth (plurality) of deconstructionist 
interpretations allowed by the text, any critical inference risks crumbling before another. 
As the doorkeeper warns the man, “If you are so drawn to it, just try to go in despite my 
veto. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the least of doorkeepers. From hall to 
hall there is one doorkeeper after another, each more powerful than the last.” Part of the 
difficulty in locating this truth of the text is its resistance to categorization. The profound 
negativity of a signification revealed only through the negation of meaning and the 
deferment of interpretive revelation colors Kafka’s illusory message with a philosophical 
hue. At the same time, it is the formality and constitutionality36 of the literary work 
(denoted by said status) that lends the text its authority. In other words, it is the mere 
pretension to be literature, the form of the narrative itself, that suggests readability just as 
the existence of language suggests its comprehensibility.  
It is perhaps this premise that Kafka draws on in situating the antithesis of a text 
that professes a formal meaning, yet denies a (fixed or objective) substantive one. The 
result is a profoundly negative text and an austere and essential literature—one that 
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speaks only of literature, of itself (“out of here”). Though etiological inference is 
notoriously obscured in Kafka’s work, this substantive nihilism seems, also, to be part of 
the root différance in the text. Divorced from its content, form remains an unbound 
signifier. Thus the derivation of its meaning may appear as the endless digression of the 
mise en abyme—the signifier that signifies the refraction of itself. Yet, having remarked 
upon this tension between surfaces and substance, we are still no closer to any resolution 
in the text. We do not know whether to privilege the failure of meaning—the pessimism 
implicit in Derrida’s différance—or the success of an aporetic non-meaning—a tentative 
hope for communication that is expressed by the eventual “radiance” perceived by the 
man from the country.   
The two sides of this struggle for meaning to exist can be expressed neatly by 
returning to the dialectic that is set up in The Trees.  
No, it can’t be done, for they are firmly wedded to the ground. But see, 
even that is only appearance.37 
 
The différance of the text and the impossibility of communication that it implies is 
certainly a facet of Kafka’s text—yet, to assume that it eclipses all possibility of meaning 
in his works is to ignore the counterpart of the dialectic.  As I have suggested, it is a shift 
in perspective that allow for a coherent and essential signification to take form in Kafka’s 
work. Instead of placing the tensions of the text in opposition—form and content, 
objective and subjective meaning(s), and most importantly, the pessimism of différance 
and the tentative hope expressed in the parables—it is necessary to view them as two 
sides of a dialectic that together form a cohesive whole and represent the fullness of both 
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objectively fixed, and fluidly polysemic language—of the failure of meaning and the 
success of a rhetorical or approximate truth.  
With that said, one might ask, whether Kafka’s critics might have missed 
something essential in his work. The reason that they consider him a failure may be, 
simply, that they sought an answer from his work, when, in truth, its primary signification 
was to elicit a question: Can the very fluidity, ambiguity and dynamic polysemy of a text 
be paradoxically reduced to its objective and fixed meaning? And if so, does this alter the 
quality of K’s expression and does it alter what literature can be? These are crucial 
question to be considered as an examination of the merits of typically modern expressive 
modes continues. This chapter must end then—true to the Moderns—with a touch of 
ambiguity. As Kafka’s priest notes, “the proceedings only gradually merge into the 
verdict.”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reading Allegories In Proust 
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If it is true that Kafka weaved a latent epistemological discourse within his texts, 
then we might consider the ways in which his contemporaries might have also 
contributed to a discussion of language and literary semiotics within their narratives.  It is 
particularly in Proust’s immense work, À la Recherche du Temps Perdu, that an analogue 
might be drawn to Kafka’s modern sensibilities about language – his mistrust of literal or 
semantic signification and his penchant for rhetorical approximation. If Kafka’s work can 
be perceived as the enactment of a sort of linguistic or hermeneutical process, Proust’s 
works seems equally to correspond to a similar act of critical reading. In this chapter, I 
will examine the compatibility of these two modernist linguistic allegories, in search of a 
common ground that might elucidate the common motivations of these modernist authors 
and thus help to situate their common goals and, potentially, those of modern literature. 
Yet, before we draw too many comparative conclusions, we should look to de 
Man’s text, Allegories of Reading—and particularly to his chapter on Proust. This section 
details a rather complex argument about metaphorical supremacy that the critic will come 
to negate, though rather hesitantly, on behalf of a sort of critical and linguistic 
breakdown. According to de Man, Proust’s writing is founded on a play of truth and 
error. This structure (allegorical or otherwise) seems comparable to Kafka’s penchant for 
dialectical tropes that both affirm and negate the semantic value of language. It would 
seem that the two authors might have shared a mutual textual climate that de Man 
describes as an “unstable commixture of literalism and suspicion.”38 This “mood of 
distrust” may well be attributed to what Steiner calls the “ancient trope of inadequate 
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discourse, the conceit whereby words fall short of the unique immediacies of individual 
experience.” 
Certainly Proust, who might be seen as delving into the depths of human 
consciousness and perception, would take issue with this shortcoming of literal, semantic 
signification to capture that, which is inherently singular. It is for this reason that the 
author tends toward the use of metaphorical and rhetorical structures within his texts as a 
means of significative approximation. Yet, we will see that these structures are not 
immune to the difficulty inherent within the division of meaning and its means of 
conveyance. As de Man notes, there is a “circular difficulty”39 that arises in the tension 
between meaning and its linguistic means that comes to “paralyzes interpretative 
discourse.”40 
On a literal level, this climate of distrust is perceivable in Proust’s works; this 
lesson is imparted to us directly. An emblematic illustration of this semantic distrust 
occurs with Gilberte’s “indecent gesture,” which takes place in the first volume of In 
Search of Lost Time, Swann’s Way. This action that we—the reader and Marcel—
perceive in all the confused modality and sensibility of a young incarnation of our 
narrator—and which is never actually described in physical terms—is a classic model of 
misinterpretation of signs within the text. While the young man attributes this gesture to 
the snobbery of Swann’s daughter, we will discover in the final volume of the series that 
the motion was in fact intended as more of a sexual invitation. This revisionist 
significative approach is effectively what de Man describes as a “play between 
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prospective and retrospective movement, an alternating motion that resembles that of 
reading, or rather that of re-reading.”41 Effectively, this is what has been deemed (as 
attributed to Georges Poulet by de Man) “temporal layers” within Proust’s text—a 
juxtaposition of different narrative modalities in the form of different significations 
attached to and invested in the same object over time. 
We have already mentioned the “indecent gesture” as an example. But perhaps 
the most potent example of the temporal layers of Proust’s text is likely found in the 
complexity of its narrative structure, more specifically within the reminisces of its 
dynamic, first-person narrator. The following passage, occurring in the first section of the 
first volume, is among the most explicit depictions of the multiplicity of narrative figures 
and temporalities that coexist in the present space of the novel. 
But for all that I now knew that I was not in any of those houses of which 
the ignorance of the waking moment had, in a flash, if not presented me 
with a distinct picture, at least persuaded me of the possible presence, my 
memory had been set in motion; as a rule I did not attempt to go to sleep 
again at once, but used to spend the greater part of my night recalling our 
life in the old days at Combray with my great-aunt, at Balbec, Paris, 
Doncieres, Venice,and the rest; remembering again all the places and 
people I had known, what I had actually seen of them, and what others had 
told me.42 
 
There appears to be at least three distinct versions of “I’s” that occur in this short section. 
These multiple selves can be differentiated by examining the use of different verbal 
tenses. There is the “I” of the simple past (“I was not in any of those houses”), which may 
still be somewhat equated  with the imperfect “I” (I did not attempt to go to sleep…but 
used to spend the greater part of my night…” Going still further back in time, there is the 
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pluperfect “I”: “all the places and people I had known, what I had actually seen of them.” 
Perhaps the most troubling “I,” however, is the first one, which sets up the string of 
memories. (“I now knew”). There is a subtle contradiction in this structure which seems 
to profess to be speaking in the present (with its use of “now”), yet in past tense (“knew”) 
at the same time. This conflation of the past and present is indicative of the temporal 
multiplicity of Proust’s narration. 
Thus, the facets of the narrator’s world—his mother’s kiss, the paths he traversed, 
the multiple figures of Swann and of our narrator—are assimilated by an exterior 
authorial consciousness. Like threads of memory, they tangle into one another until what, 
at one point, was a firm material reality becomes a web of abstract ideas connected by the 
invisible fibers that hold together our associations of the object. This invisible web that 
forms Proustian consciousness captures the imprint of the image, and subordinates it to a 
larger conception of the whole that is built by the layering of these impressions.  
The derivation of these temporal layers might best be explained in acknowledging 
an undeniable precept of the author’s work—the idealizing process that is inherent in 
both memory and in perception. In Proust’s writing the transmission of an idea or the 
formation of a memory bears the indelible imprint of the narrator’s fingerprints. 
Fertilized by his imaginative powers, reflections of people, nature and places outgrow 
their former unadorned selves; they extend beyond their material (or, one might say, 
semantic) bounds, now brimming with a newly found significance.  
This process of consciousness that infiltrates, alters and idealizes the elements it 
perceives is suggested by the scene of the “magic lantern,” which occurs in the first 
section of Swann’s Way.  
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If the lantern were moved I could still distinguish Golo’s horse advancing 
across the window-curtains, swelling out with their curves and diving into 
their folds. The body of Golo himself, being of the same supernatural 
substance as his steed’s, overcame every material obstacle—everything 
that seemed to bar his way—by taking it as an ossature and absorbing it 
into himself: even the doorknob—on which, adapting themselves at once, 
his red cloak or his pale face, still as noble and as melancholy, floated 
invincibly—would never betray the least concern at this 
transvertebration.43 
 
The projection of Golo and his steed, with all their “supernatural substance,” onto the 
“material obstacles” of the narrator’s walls provides a clear metaphor for the mutability 
of the idealization process involved in consciousness and perception. The materiality of 
the object remains a mere “ossature,” a skeleton to be filled out and absorbed by the fluid 
currents of human feeling.44  
This idealization of his the subjects he observes and the dynamic fluidity of their 
perception arises within “the shifting and confused gusts of memory”45 that comprise his 
reflections on his youth. As Proust writes in the early pages of this first volume: 
Perhaps the immobility of things that surround us is forced upon them by 
our conviction that they are themselves and not anything else, by the 
immobility of our conception of them.46 
 
The general instability of perception is a clear tenet of the work’s philosophical 
implications. Yet, another issue to be explored in his text is the way in which this 
uncertain movement of meaning, perception and memory are translated into the linguistic 
                                                        
43
 Proust, Marcel. Swann's Way. Trans. Terence K. Moncrieff and C.K. Scott Moncrieff. United States: 
Modern Library, 1992. P.11. Print. 
 
44
 It might be of use to briefly note that this image would be equally suited to a metaphor for linguistic 
structures—particularly the classic semiotic relation of signifier and signified. Just as Golo and his steed fill 
out the contours of young Marcel’s walls, the singularity of an intended meaning (the signified) is projected 
onto the rigid exterior of language (the signifier). 
 
45
 Proust, Marcel. Swann's Way. Trans. Terence K. Moncrieff and C.K. Scott Moncrieff. United States: 
Modern Library, 1992. P.5. Print. 
 
46
 Proust, Marcel. Swann's Way. Trans. Terence K. Moncrieff and C.K. Scott Moncrieff. United States: 
Modern Library, 1992. P.5. Print. 
 38
structures of the text. Within the literarily enacted semiotic relationship of memory and 
language, a hermeneutical and critical mistrust emerges—one that mirrors the suspicion 
of discord between subject and object that is inherent in the “…mobility of things” 
engendered by the modality of the text’s temporal layers.  
De Man’s argument eventually (though hesitantly) abandons any semantic or 
literal readings of the text in favor of a paradigmatic one. That is to say, his reading is 
based not on any of the text’s substantive revelations, but on the rhetorical structures that 
comprise them and their relation to this meaning that they contain. The primary assertion 
of De Man’s text is of a discord between “literal” and “thematic” significations within the 
text. The critic suggests that 
 Proust can affect such confidence in the persuasive power of his 
metaphors that he pushes stylistic defiance to the point of stating the 
assumed synthesis of light and dark in the incontrovertible language of 
numerical ratio.47 
 
He goes on to quote an example of this “stylistic defiance” in Proust: “the dark cool of 
my warm room was to the full sunlight of the street what the shadow is to the sunray, that 
is to say equally luminous.” The “incontrovertible language” here is comprised by 
analogical tropes, yet compromised by its substantive antithesis; apart from the abortive 
analogical claim which likens the luminosity of a “shadow” to that of a “sunray,” we 
might note the nonsensical pairing of “the dark cool of my warm room.” Thus, if we 
ignore the semantic content of the text and privilege the tropic and rhetorical forms, the 
significative structure seems to hold (“there are no limits to what tropes can get away 
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with”48). Yet under the reader’s scrutiny of its own semantic value and reasoning (its lack 
of logical cohesion), the analogy breaks down. As de man goes on to say, 
Structures and relays of this kind, in which properties are substituted49 and 
exchanged, characterize tropological systems as being, at least in part, 
paradigmatic or metaphorical systems. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
introductory passage on reading …was placed, from the beginning, under 
the auspices of truth and error.50 
 
The irresolution of the dual significations is a harbinger of both an epistemological doubt 
(a “mood of [linguistic] distrust”) and of a tension that we have already seen in Kafka’s 
texts (particularly in Before the Law) between a stylistic or formal surface that professes 
meaning and, a logical impasse that denies one.  
 A similar argument can be made for Giotto’s frescoes in all of their allegorical 
significations. Many critics will argue that in order for the frescoes to bear a perceivable 
and attainable value, they must be imbued with a “semantic intensity” by means of 
allegorical detail and icons. But this representational power of these frescoes seems to fall 
short as we do not know whether to privilege the literal or ascribed value (in this case 
denoted by the inscription of “caritas” on the painting) or its formal and purely 
representational value. The result is a “dissonance” of “proper” and “literal” 
significations within the allegory, as “the two meanings fight it out with all the blind 
power of stupidity.”51 De Man elaborates on this point as follows: 
…it seems that the author has lost confidence in the effectiveness of the 
substitutive power generated by the resemblances: he states a proper 
meaning , directly or by way of an intra-textual code or tradition, by using 
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a literal sign which bears no resemblance to that meaning and which 
conveys, in its turn, a meaning that is proper to it but does not coincide 
with the proper meaning of the allegory. The facial expression of the 
“heavy and mannish” matron painted by Giotto connotes nothing 
charitable…52 
 
Thus the difficulty of these passages appears to be synonymous with the “circular 
difficulty” which the critic has previously mentioned, and perhaps with Derrida’s concept 
of différance, as we have already applied the term to Kafka. It seems to be this 
(hermeneutically) paralytic suspension of meaning between stylistic and substantive 
elements that provokes de Man’s conclusion that Proust’s “allegory of reading narrates 
the impossibility of reading.”53 
  Earlier on in the same chapter, de Man links the seductive powers of metaphor to 
the dual “iridescence” and “immobility” of the image of the fountain that recurs 
throughout In Search of Lost Time. The harmonizing effect of this metaphor (effectively 
for metaphorical signification) lends at least the illusion of stability to the apparent 
arbitrariness of analogical and rhetorical substitution processes such as metonymy, 
allegory or metaphor. In de Man’s words, 
The miraculous interference of water and light in the refracted rainbow of 
the color spectrum make its appearance throughout the novel, infallibly 
associated with the thematics of metaphor as totalization. It is the perfect 
analogon for complementarity, the differences that make up the parts 
absorbed in the unity of the whole as the colors of the spectrum are 
absorbed in the original white light.54 
 
Thus, in this vision of unity that is conjured by Proust, elements that are substituted in 
metaphor appear to be bounded by an established ontological proximity and a natural 
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complementarity (what de Man calls “necessity”). But, by the end of his analysis (having 
been confronted by the “auspices” of truth and error), the critic reduces this transcendent 
experience to “a mere association of ideas.” In his words, “the relationship between the 
literal and figurative senses of the metaphor is always, in this sense, metonymic, though 
motivated by a constitutive tendency to pretend the opposite.” 
 Thus subjected to the epistemological enquiry of the critic, the fountain is reduced 
to “a much more disturbing movement, a vibration between truth and error that keeps the 
two readings from ever converging.” In this fashion, the “impossibility of reading” is 
reasserted. As de Man turns his back on the once apparently seductive power of the 
fountain, he ends by suggesting that it, now, as an emblem of epistemological 
uncertainty, “functions like an oxymoron” or an “aporia”—that is, a rhetorical expression 
of doubt. Yet, the question remains whether the simultaneous inclusion of seemingly 
colluding readings might be possible. The fountain metaphor may well have a more 
inclusive totalizing effect that de Man did not anticipate – one that could truly lend 
coherency to the dual assertions of the text.  
 The negative “aporia” that we are left with is indeed a critical or interpretative 
dead end. On the other hand, it could be viewed as representing the enactment of a 
negative epistemological movement—an assertion of the impossibility of metaphor or 
allegory— that is suggested by the text and enacted in its critical deconstruction (whether 
this is done by the text itself as de Man posits, or by a critic’s act of interpretation). Yet, 
the real success of the metaphor goes beyond the mere rhetorical signification of a 
negative epistemology (to put it rather more simply, that element of doubt that appears to 
be part of any assertion and affirmation in Proust’s texts). But the remarkable effect of 
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Proust’s work, which is achieved in scenes of transcendence like those involving the 
Madeleine or Vinteuil’s sonata, is the extent to which it seems to overcome such doubt, if 
only momentarily. In so doing Proust achieves an effect whereby the subordination of the 
prevailing sense of fallibility to a brief moment of truth amounts to the simultaneous 
positioning and undoing of its primary epistemological premise.  
 This subordination is of a part to the whole, and suggests, now, the containment 
of error within truth and thus sets up the larger structure of the novel as a coherent whole. 
Proust even suggests that failure, far from establishing the impossibility of truth, instead 
works to enhance its eventual emergence. 
While the kitchen-maid—who, all unawares, made the superior qualities 
of Francoise shine with added lustre, just as Error, by force of contrast, 
enhances the triumph of Truth—served coffee which (according to 
Mamma) was nothing more than hot water… 55 
 
Instead of a “vibration between truth and error”—a phrase that might be more accurately 
attributed to Kafka’s significative ambivalence—what we seem to have in Proust’s texts 
is an effective deferment of error, a suspension of skepticism to a larger structure that 
might denote the truth of the text (thus, a supplementary and not a complementary 
relationship). It is, thus, within the juxtaposition of the kitchen-maid and Francoise and 
the products of their service—the hot water compared to coffee—that this relation is 
elucidated.  
To be sure, moments of misinterpretation along with the breakdown of tropic and 
rhetorical devices are unmasked as moments of error within the text. But such moments 
and the doubt they inspire are not meant to have any reliable autonomy of discourse and 
                                                        
55
 Proust, Marcel. Swann's Way. Trans. Terence K. Moncrieff and C.K. Scott Moncrieff. United States: 
Modern Library, 1992. P.113. Print. 
 
 43
must be subordinated to the larger structure of the text. This is the nature of the text’s 
“temporal layers” that flatten the discourse of truth and error to one of an eventual truth 
by having erred.56 Thus, the errors of the text are to its truth what the heterogeneous and 
individual colors of light are to the entire spectrum; it is the individual colors, that in their 
totality—the completeness of their integration—form the homogenous totality of white 
light.57 It is equally in this sense that the absolute distance between the omniscience of 
the author (as truth) and the apparent modality of its different narrators (as error) might 
be dissolved within this spectral illusion of coherence, unity and truth. 
 To affirm this general structure of subordination and, thus, the possibility of 
reliable signification, we might return to our previous discussion of Gilberte’s “indecent 
gesture” and the rectification of its significance in the final volume of the series, Time 
Regained. If the first volumes are symbolic of error—and it is interesting to note that 
almost all of De Man’s argument for a reading allegory comes from Swann’s Way—then 
it is possible to see the errors of the young author as having been righted by the final 
volume, as the author and narrative figure comes to realize his potential as a writer. 
Indeed, the titular optimism of this final volume certainly does not suggest a prominence 
of notions such as error, and interpretative analysis that abound within earlier sections of 
the text. Furthermore, the author seems to have retraced his steps, now offering a revised 
truth that does not present itself with the same dangerous hermeneutical uncertainty that 
de Man has uncovered in Swann’s Way. The enactment of this revision is signified 
primarily by Gilberte’s long awaited explanation of her gesture that is deferred until the 
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last volume of the set. Thus, near the culminating term of the series, time is “regained.” 
At least some errors of perception are set right and, in this process, we witness the 
coming of age of Marcel. In this sense, the totality of In Search of Lost time depicts an 
epistemological derivation of authorial truth and the concomitant success of Proust (or 
the narrator, Marcel) as an author of great fiction. 
 Now, having considered Proust’s text as an allegory of reading, what 
demonstrable connections can be formed between it and Kafka’s epistemological 
sensibility? If we are to take Paul de Man’s claims seriously, then, Proust’s series takes 
on a similar function to that of, say, Kafka’s Before the Law in that it raises fundamental 
question about epistemological and linguistic uncertainty. In the same way that Kafka’s 
text leaves his reader scratching his head (as an enactment of hermeneutical folly), 
Proust’s raises key questions about what constituted a work of literature and to what 
degree any semiotic and linguistic relays are capable of any sort of semantic certainty.  
Thus, in both authors’ works we observe a fundamental tension between the its 
form, which suggest readability and, indeed, professes a meaning, and a substantive 
aporia that denies one—a tension that threatens at any moment to nullify any possibility 
of truth within the text. It would seem that this modern sensibility about language might 
be related to a general climate of mistrust of language and general skepticism about 
Enlightenment ideals that had invested reason with an infallible power to deduce truth 
(we have seen that Kant’s logic falls far short when faced with logical impasse of Before 
the Law).  
 This statement can be supported by the argument that both texts (Kafka’s and 
Proust’s) seem to hinge on a dialectic of truth and error—the success or the failure of 
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language itself. This is the primary indication of the interpretation of Kafka’s, The 
Vulture that I have postulated in the previous chapter. The readings of the passage that I 
offer amount exactly to a signification and a significative pairing of truth and error. That 
is to say, the man who is torn to shreds can be viewed as a failure—one that represents 
the death of the authorial figure and subsequent failure of signification. Despite the 
pessimism of the reading it is still possible to salvage the success of meaning and of 
signification in the image of the (no longer circling) vulture that has finally hit its mark. 
Coherence is lent to this tale, as it is in Proust’s novels, by a subordination—but not 
annihilation—of one reading to another. Thus, this notion of sublation that entails the 
containment of failure as a necessary facet within a dialectic that contains the fullness of 
an enactment of epistemological truth and error, is perhaps as relevant to Proust as it is to 
Kafka.  
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Henry James’s Secret 
 
 
“I don’t quite know how to explain it to you,” he said, “but it was the very 
fact that your notice of my book had a spice of intelligence, it was just 
your exceptional sharpness, that produced the feeling — a very old story 
with me, I beg you to believe — under the momentary influence of which 
I used in speaking to that good lady the words you so naturally resent. I 
don’t read the things in the newspapers unless they’re thrust upon me as 
that one was — it’s always one’s best friend who does it! But I used to 
read them sometimes — ten years ago. I dare say they were in general 
rather stupider then; at any rate it always struck me they missed my little 
point with a perfection exactly as admirable when they patted me on the 
back as when they kicked me in the shins. Whenever since I’ve happened 
to have a glimpse of them they were still blazing away — still missing it, I 
mean, deliciously. YOU miss it, my dear fellow, with inimitable 
assurance; the fact of your being awfully clever and your article’s being 
awfully nice doesn’t make a hair’s breadth of difference. It’s quite with 
you rising young men,” Vereker laughed, “that I feel most what a failure I 
am!”58 
 
In these opening lines of The Figure in the Carpet, Henry James’s protagonist, 
Vereker, intimates to a young critic that his work harbors a hidden meaning. As the 
conversation continues, the fictional author insists that this secret is “the fullest intention 
of the lot” and “a triumph of patience and ingenuity [that] stretches…from book to book, 
and everything else, comparatively, plays over the surface of it.” He goes even further in 
suggesting that “The thing’s as concrete there as a bird in a cage, a bait on a hook, a piece 
of cheese in a mouse-trap. It’s stuck into every volume as your foot is stuck into your 
shoe. It governs every line, it chooses every word, it dots every i, it places every 
comma.”
59
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 Is it possible that Vereker’s musings are more than simply a disposable fiction—
that, in fact, they might tell us something about the latent motives of James himself? This, 
of course, is a difficult—if not impossible—claim to make. The task of identifying this 
hidden meaning with any certainty is even more problematic. However, modern readings 
of James’s work suggest that there is, in fact, a latent discourse that is submerged beneath 
the surfaces of his texts and its focal intrigue, lying dormant for the critic to stagger upon. 
In much of James’s work, there is an uncanny sense of an uncertain and uneasy meaning 
that resists the reader. Certainly the ambiguity of the text, its interpretative 
impenetrability and epistemological uncertainty are core tenets of the text. As in Kafka’s 
writing, these tropes elaborate a concealed discourse about writing, linguistic 
transmission, and critical interpretation that constitute a sort of allegorical enactment of 
hermeneutical uncertainty. Could it be, thus, that this latent discussion of language is 
James’ secret? Certainly, the image of “cheese in a mouse-trap” and “bait on a hook” 
suggests a kind of epistemological dilemma that we have seen in Kafka (we find the 
exact image of the mouse trap in Kafka’s A Little Fable). The genius of James’ secret is, 
then, perhaps that it is the elaboration of a paradox that renders it ever elusive to the 
critic. Even, if we are to say that we have faltered upon this meaning—the uncertainty of 
an inherently ambiguous and plural language—we have already reduced it by ascribing to 
that which is necessarily metaphorical and plural a literal value and fallen into the very 
trap that we have attempted to identify. Like Kafka, James seems to have stumbled upon 
the allure of the unsayable and of a meaning that is as irreducible as the language from 
which it is derived—only a little more than a decade earlier. 
 However, The Figure in the Carpet, does not divulge this secret; it merely points 
to it. (In this sense, the story is akin to Hofmannsthal’s Letter to Lord Chandos in its 
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literal directness—that is, its meaning is not so elaborately veiled within allegory.) It is 
rather in James’ Turn of the Screw that we find what is probably the most masterfully 
constructed allegory for polysemical language, and the interpretative difficulties 
(impossibility) it engenders. The enigmatic status of the text is derived, as it is in Kafka’s 
parables, from its anticipation of its own critical reception. A technique aimed at 
subverting its critic—one that can equally be related to an allegorical discussion of 
linguistic transmission—is the text’s narrative structure: its three-fold chain of unreliable 
narrators that serves to undermine the certainty of each successive link in the series. What 
we have, then, is an account of a recounting of an account of an experience: An unnamed 
man narrates the introduction (as the group of listeners are gathered “round the fire”). He 
will soon come to narrate Douglas’s telling of the story, who is reading the manuscript of 
the governess that is written as a first-person report – itself a sort interpretation of the 
events that she experiences. 
The central plot itself consists of the experience of a young woman who takes a 
position as a governess to two young children, Miles and Flora. Her task is to manage the 
pair at the summer estate, Bly Manor, and is given with the stipulation that she must, 
under no circumstances, communicate with or involve her employer in handling her 
administrative duties. During her time at the country estate, she is visited by a pair of 
apparitions, which, she becomes increasingly convinced, are assailing the children whom 
she has been charged with protecting. Having conferred with the housekeeper, 
Mrs.Grose, she comes to learn that ghosts she has seen bear the likeness of two former—
and now deceased—servants, Peter Quint and Miss Jessel. She also gathers from her 
fellow employee that there seems to have been some sort of perverse sexual relationship 
between the pair of servants and the children; yet these claims remain largely 
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unconfirmed.  Much of her account deals with her own judgment of the situation, 
wrestling with her uncertainty about whether the children are truly possessed, and if the 
spirits she sees are real or if her she herself has descended into madness.  The story 
climaxes as she forces a confession from young Miles, and as she names the ghost of 
Peter Quint in front of the boy. With the utterance of the deceased man’s name, the boy is 
smothered to death in the governess’s arms and the tale ends. 
If James had simply decided to tell the tale from the sole perspective of the 
governess, it would have made for a different story. Standing alone, the transcription of 
events that was passed down to Douglas might hold together as a credible realist fiction 
that would be vulnerable to being reduced as either a Freudian psychoanalysis or a 
metaphysical struggle against ghastly spirits (we will see that these are the two camps of 
criticism that emerge shortly after the publication of the tale in 1899). Yet taken with its 
introduction, the text becomes susceptible to the nonnegotiable ambiguity and suspicion 
that appears to undermine the Governess’s reliability by virtue of the text’s narrative 
layers. We might confirm this with Douglas’s admonition in the opening lines of the tale: 
“The story won’t tell… ‘not in any literal vulgar way.” In this equating of literal and 
vulgar, we might recognize an indication of the author’s distaste for objective depiction 
and for communicating his point to his reader outright (although, ironically, literary 
historians have generally seemed content to classify him as a realist writer—perhaps 
having missed his secret, the hidden figure in the carpet). It is likely that this is a warning 
to the critical reader who, by nature, attempts to wrest a fixed and rigid signification from 
the story and, indeed, an indication of a sort of epistemological uncertainty that will 
permeate the latent rhetoric and concealed meaning of the story. 
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In spite of this warning, the story has yielded an immense number of critical 
responses, the plurality of which is doubtless a symptom of the work’s impenetrable 
ambiguity. In order to establish the epistemological questions that the text presents, it is 
essential to consider a handful of these perspectives on the tale. Critical receptions of the 
tale that immediately followed the text’s reception can be separated into two mutually 
exclusive camps.  The first would exonerate the governess, in the assertion that the 
apparitions she perceives are indeed real. The story would thus be read as her struggle 
against the evil forces that threaten the children she has pledged to protect. The second, 
however, posits a Freudian deconstruction of the text that insists, instead, on the 
governess’s mental instability and the apparitions of the text as a symptom of her 
pathological neurosis caused by her repressed love for the master.  
 Edmund Wilson is the best-known proponent of this latter theory, and indeed he 
presents a fair amount of evidence to support it. He notes that that the ghost of Peter 
Quint first appears on a tower—a clear phallic symbol—while the apparition of Mrs. 
Jessel is first seen by the governess on a lake. He points to the phallic imagery of the 
stick, that Flora attempts to employ as a mast. The potency and multiplicity of these 
Freudian motifs, in tandem with the “erotic ambiguities” posed by the text, suggest that 
James probably placed these images deliberately in his text. Yet, it may be, as Shoshana 
Felman suggest in her book, Madness and the Turn of the Screw, that these tropes were 
set as a kind of trap to catch the overzealous and “prepossessed” Freudian critic. Indeed, 
it seems that Wilson has, in fact, stumbled blindly into James’ elaborate hermeneutical 
trap. As we have noted, Wilson’s interpretation rests on the assumption that the 
governess is in love with the master and that the apparitions she encounters are a 
symptom of her resulting sexual frustration. Yet, when we return to the preface—and to 
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the warning we have considered earlier—it becomes clear that James has intentionally 
barred this path of interpretation. Consider the quote in full: 
Mrs. Griffin, however, expressed the need for a little more light. 
“who was it she was in love with?” 
“The story will tell,” I took it upon myself to reply. (…). 
“the story won’t tell,” said Douglas; “not in any literal, vulgar 
way.”60 
 
Wilson’s argument hinges directly on fixing the governess’s lover as the master. Thus, in 
making this assumption as the crux of his interpretation and naming the unnamable, the 
Freudian critic has done precisely what the preface of the novel has expressly forbidden; 
he has committed the very offense of which we have been specifically forewarned.  
 The glaring issue that faces Felman’s analysis, then, is how not to fall into the 
same trap that has snared Wilson’s attempt at interpretation. How can the later critic posit 
a plausible reading of the text that preserves the ambiguity and inherent plurality of the 
text’s significations? The answer to this dilemma for Felman seems to be that she (as she 
herself notes) orients her criticism not as a response to what the meaning of the text is, 
but rather how it conveys its meaning. In this way, the epistemological nature of her 
argument is brought to light, echoing the similarly epistemological undertones of James’s 
rhetorically veiled message (and to an extent the epistemological struggle of the 
governess in trying to confirm the certainty of her apparitions as well). Felman’s 
comment also hints at the circularity of the language that sustains the author’s (James’s) 
ambiguity, and that of the critic’s logic in reducing the inherent polysemy of James’s 
signification. Still the question looms (as Felman puts it): “Is it at all possible to read and 
interpret ambiguity without reducing it in the very process of interpretation?” In spite of 
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this hindrance, the critic goes on to make a rather convincing argument on behalf of latent 
meaning of the text. 
 Perhaps the most prominent indication of this linguistic or epistemologically 
minded argument within the text is, as Felman suggests, its chain of “superimposed” 
narratives, and the chain of readings that they generate in their interpretation of each 
subsequent layer. The process of transmission and interpretation thus begins at the very 
outset of the tale. Starting from the inside out, we should look to the most overt 
interpretative phenomenon in the text – that is, the governess’s attempts at unraveling the 
mystery of the seemingly possessed children and the apparitions at Bly manor. In this 
sense, the focal point of the text is itself an exercise of critical interpretation. Like a critic 
who analyzes James’s text, she pursues the answer to the uncertain predicament of Bly’s 
ghosts.  
In the subsequent voices of narrative, we see that this act of interpretation reflects 
from one layer to the next. The second link is then in the transmission of the story from 
the Governess to Douglas in the passing over of the manuscript containing the ghastly 
account. Typical of the tale, the details of the pair’s relationship are obscured: “ ‘She sent 
me the pages in question before she died.’ They were all listening now, and of course 
there was somebody… to draw the inference. But if he put the inference by without a 
smile it was also without irritation”61 The inference, as we will see, is that Douglas had 
been in love with the governess. Yet, as is the custom in the tale, inference is never 
untouched by doubt; like the “pages in question,” the question of love remains an 
irresolvable question throughout the tale. We have already seen the example of Wilson 
defining the governess’ love as the faulty cornerstone of his Freudian reading of the text. 
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It seems fitting that love becomes such an elusive idea in the text due to its inherently 
ideal and abstract nature. In a sense, it is the singularity of its point of reference and the 
polysemy that is thus generated by the word that makes this concept (except perhaps, in a 
literal or vulgar way) particularly resistant to the commonality and commoditization of 
language.  
Thus, in the following passage we can trace the way in which the governess’s 
love remains stubbornly ambiguous, refusing to be placed outright (between the 
characters of the text)—and even to be named. 
‘…I was much there in that year – it was a beautiful one; and we had, in 
her off-hours, some strolls and talks in the garden – talks in which she 
struck me as awfully clever and nice. Oh yes; don’t grin: I liked her 
extremely and am glad to this day to think she liked me too. If she hadn’t 
she wouldn’t have told me. She had never told anyone. It wasn’t simply 
that she said so, but that I knew she hadn’t. I was sure; I could see. You’ll 
easily judge why when you hear.’… 
‘I see. She was in love.’ 
He laughed for the first time. ‘You are acute. Yes, she was in love. That is 
she had been. That came out – she couldn’t tell her story without its 
coming out. I saw it, and she saw I saw it; but neither of us spoke of it. I 
remember …62 
 
In this passage we receive confirmation that the governess “had” been in love. 
Yet, this does not render the issue of whom she loved any less problematic. James’s 
italics here seem to point to the ambiguity of the statement. Furthermore, it is telling that 
neither of them spoke of the love that they “saw,” as if this would have been a 
debasement of its idealistic integrity. Yet, perhaps most emblematic of the convoluted 
narrative layers of the text is the sentence. “I saw it, and she saw I saw it.” It is the 
movement of these glances, reflecting off one another, that suggests the confusion of the 
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narrative relays that set themselves up in a sort of mise en abyme structure, as if to 
obscure the point of origin.63  
What we have here – within the text’s interpretive layers – is what Felman refers 
to as a “reading effect” (or, rather, an accumulation of reading effects) and what has been 
described by Roland Barthes, perhaps more eloquently in his text, Critique et Vérité: 
“Faire une seconde écriture avec la premiere écriture de l’oeuvre, c’est en effet ouvrir la 
voie des relais imprévisibles, leur infini des glaces.”64 In this case, the point of origin that 
is being obscured is that of the governess’s love, which seems to be confused and 
displaced between the narrative elements of the text. Following the above passage, we 
come to the lines I have already quoted twice, which now take on a slightly altered 
meaning. 
‘Who was it she was in love with?’ 
‘The story will tell,’ I took upon myself to reply… 
‘The story won’t tell,’ said Douglas; ‘not in any literal or vulgar way.”65 
 
Having assumed the third and final link (confined within the  text itself), the 
narrator takes it upon himself to become the interpreter of Douglas’s statement. Yet, as is 
made clear by Douglas’s enigmatic response, he has committed an error in his 
assumption of hermeneutical certainty. In truth, we are never told explicitly with whom 
the governess was in love. There are indications that this love of the governess refers to 
her affection for Douglas, just as there are equally suggestive signs that she is in love 
with the master (certainly Wilson infers it). Love, thus, is one such example of an 
impenetrable premise upon which the ambiguity of the text seems to hinge. 
                                                        
63
 Felman, Shoshana. Madness and Writing. New York: Cornell University Press, 1994. P.177. Print. 
64
 Barthes, Roland. Critique et Vérité. Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1966. P.6. Print. 
(“To do a second writing of the first work has the effect of opening an unforeseeable relay of meaning, an 
infinite play of mirrors.”) 
65
 James, Henry. The Turn of the Screw and The Aspern Papers. New York: Penguin Books, 1984. P.255. 
Print. 
 55
Yet, there is still another level of interpretation—another spectral relay—that we 
have not yet considered in the text. Just as the narrative sets up a chain of readings, the 
text is built to anticipate and the gaze of its (exterior) reader. Thus, James’s reader finds 
himself reenacting the hermeneutical processes that are contained within the text. It is the 
text’s external relationship to the critic that allows its rhetoric to take an augmented form 
under the transformative gaze of its reader. This process fertilizes most potently the 
polysemy of the text with all the rhetorical possibility of its ambiguous language. Set up 
almost like a Rorschach test, James’s text—in its resistance to being read or reduced, 
instead effectively analyzes its reader, as if to inverse the accepted paradigm of the reader 
who comprehends the text. We might even think of James’s image of the figure in the 
carpet. Anyone who has seen the complex patterns on these Persian rugs knows that there 
is undoubtedly an abundance of patterns, designs and shapes that might be viewed within 
its twists and turns. One man may see one image, where another sees an entirely different 
one. The burden of meaning is therefore pushed onto the reader and the act of teasing a 
signification out of the decided ambiguity of such a text is to ignore its definitive 
plurality and irreducibility. Thus, it is this contre-abime66—the critic, or second writing, 
set in relation to the abime (the text)—that is most relevant to Barthes’s notion of 
unforeseeable relays and endless reflections of meaning. In this case, it allows for an 
allegorical reading of The Turn of the Screw that would posit a reflection on language— 
in other words, the text would become a discourse about discourse. Taking this into 
account, it would seem that my conclusion—that the ambiguity of the text hinges on the 
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idea of love in the text—begins to appear somewhat shorthanded and far too literal to be 
of any use to a critic. 
To piece together the epistemological meaning that Felman suggests, it would be 
appropriate to view the notion of love in James’s tale as an allegoreme67 that corresponds 
to a plural, indefinable language—thereby paradoxically both signifying (allegorically) 
the idea of a polysemy and (literally) enacting its irresolvable ambiguity. Love, in a 
sense, is an excellent candidate as the literal placeholder for non-literal language due to 
its largely abstract constitution. It is perhaps the pinnacle of—if not the most highly 
esteemed—subjective viewpoint, adhering strictly to a singularity of feeling that cannot 
exist outside its beholder. To reduce love to a literal meaning is to deny its definitive 
singular essence and to diminish it to a commonality, a banality and a mere linguistic 
commodity.  
Additionally, love is, as Felman notes, an object of transference throughout the 
tale. She notes that the love of the governess and the master that is substituted for the love 
of Douglas and the governess, which allows for the very transmission of the story (the 
passing on of the manuscript). She continues to trace this relationship between the 
unnamed narrator and Douglas, noting a climate of seduction that is involved in the 
latter’s telling of the tale. Thus, love and transmission seem to be dependent factors in the 
text. 
If the text is concerned, then, with aspects of transmission, of reading and 
comprehension, we must look further into the narrative – the actual account of the 
governess – to see the way in which these partially allegorical and partially mimetic 
articulations take form.  One insight that Felman makes about this central part of the tale 
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is that it is largely based around letters. She notes that the manuscript containing the 
account is a missive sent through the mail, and thus itself constitutes a letter. 
Additionally, at the beginning of the governess’s stay at Bly, she is forwarded a puzzling 
letter from the master (who has declined to read it himself). This letter explains that Miles 
has been expelled from school—though it does not tell on what grounds the young boy 
has been dismissed. Secondly, the governess tells us that she intercepts the children’s 
letters to the master. And finally there is the letter that she intends to write to master (at 
Mrs. Grose’s appeal) to inform him of the strange occurrences at Bly.  
If we consider that the manuscript is a letter—one that itself pertains to letters—
then we have once more a mise en abyme structure, which itself is set up as a contre-
abime in relation to the prefaces of the text. It is perhaps this notion that prompts Felman 
conclusion that “the story then is nothing but the circulation of a violated letter which 
materially travels from place to place through the successive changes of its addressees, 
and through a series of address-corrections.”68 While this logic certainly applies to the 
tale’s percolation through narrative elements, the same process is repeated in letters that 
are written at Bly. Consider the letter detailing Miles’ expulsion: 
The postbag, that evening (…) contained a letter for me, which, however, 
in the hand of my employer, I found to be composed but of a few words 
enclosing another, addressed to himself, with a seal still unbroken. “This, I 
recognize, is from the head-master, and the head-master’s an awful bore. 
Read him, please; deal with him; but mind you don’t report.69 
 
The letter explaining the boy’s misconduct is itself enclosed in another letter as if to place 
the former en-abyme. Furthermore, it is the enigma posed by the letter—the obscurity 
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surrounding the boy’s dismissal—that will prompt the governess to continue the chain of 
letters in the text.  
If we read further on into the citation, there appears another interesting hint of 
James’s rhetorically concealed, yet keenly modern perception of language.  
I broke the seal with a great effort—so great a one that it was a long time 
coming to it; took the unopened missive at last to my room and only 
attacked it just before going to bed.70 
 
There seems to be both a great difficulty and, indeed, violence inherent in the act of 
breaking the seal of the letter. The violence of the act seems to be related, in some senses, 
to the very act of reading. In a sense, to read and to interpret are inseparable from one 
another as the process of the former involves a reduction of language—otherwise what 
edification could one derive from it? Thus the reduction and ascription of a literal and 
fixed value to language bears a certain mark of violence for James, which we will return 
to in the analysis of the final act of the novel.  
 Another key insight made by the critic is that all of the letters written within the 
governess’ account, though they are all intercepted or destroyed, share one address. It 
seems to be no coincidence that they are all addressed to the Master—that they should all 
strive to convene at such a location, which has already been expressly prohibited. We 
should recall the condition of the governess employment at Bly:  
He told her frankly of this difficulty—that for several applicants the 
conditions had been prohibitive. (…) It sounded strange, and all the more 
so because of his main condition.” 
“Which was—?” 
“That she should never trouble him—never, never; neither appeal 
nor complain nor write about anything, only meet all questions 
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herself; receive all moneys from his solicitor, take the whole thing 
over and let him alone.”71 
 
From the beginning, the relationship of the governess and the Master is a contract of strict 
non-communication and non-union. Thus, the meaning of this “difficulty” that is spoken 
about may extend beyond the mere circumstance of the governess. It seems to point to the 
type of literary, or more specifically, ontological difficulty that is the linguistic condition 
of the text; that is, it is decidedly ambiguous, written to withhold a secret and to resist its 
reader’s comprehension. Like the Master, who has withdrawn from the text and from any 
communication with the governess, the meaning of the text is placed decidedly out of our 
reach. Viewed in this way, the figure of the Master is almost exactly like the inaccessible 
absolute(s) that Kafka’s characters strive after in his novels parables. Just as the Law in 
The Trial is to Joseph K. or the emperor is to the messenger of the Imperial message, the 
Master is to the governess; he is representative of an inaccessible authorial certainty that 
is continually sought after, but ultimately unattainable (“No one could push through here, 
even with a message from a dead man”). Another indication of this sort of ontological 
difficulty that should be addressed is the governess’s difficulty in breaking the seal of the 
letter addressed to the Master. It is fitting that the contents of the letter remain largely 
ambiguous and obscure to her, as they are not meant for her. Its meaning is reserved for 
the Master just as the meaning of a text that exhibits ontological difficulty is reserved for 
its author.  
 Having situated the relationship of the Governess to the Master—the reader and 
interpreter to the Ultimate and objective signification—it becomes easy to see how a 
linguistic allegory might take shape in the text. In terms of the apparitions of the text, 
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Felman makes a compelling argument that they represent the interpretative and 
polysemic possibilities of a story that can neither be confirmed nor denied. In this sense, 
they occupy a position that is similar to the unfixable ambiguity of love in the prologue. 
The idea of a ghost—something that is merely a shade of a true or material form—is, 
indeed, fitting for this purpose.  
 However, it is the role of the children in such an allegory of transmission that 
Felman seems to neglect. It would seem (after some textual analysis), that they suggest 
the innocence of a pure and autonomous language—one that is unaware of itself and of 
its own signification, having been estranged from its author’s motives. The possibility 
that they are possessed by the ghosts of Bly manor (as representative of the possible but 
uncertain significations of language) would seem to confirm this theory. With this in 
mind, consider this passage, which follows the governess’s resolve to force a confession 
from Miles concerning the ghosts at Bly: 
He had picked up his hat, which he had brought in, and stood twirling it in 
a way that gave me…a perverse horror of what I was doing. To do it in 
any way was an act of violence, for what did it consist of but the obtrusion 
of the idea of grossness and guilt on a small helpless creature who had 
been for me a revelation of the possibilities of beautiful discourse…So we 
circled about with terrors and scruples, fighters not daring to close.72 
 
The “twirling” and “helpless” innocence of the boy certainly purports a pure language, 
(like that of Mallarmé, for example) that is untouched by the “violence” of rigid semantic 
confinement. To force a confession from the boy is thus to literalize the language he 
represents and to deny it the “possibilities of beautiful discourse”—a phrase that seems to 
point the polysemy that is inherent in James’ ambiguous language. The impasse at which 
the Miles and the governess are left is described poetically as “fighters not daring to 
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close.” This is indeed the impasse that James’ reader perceives in the multiple and 
dynamic meanings of the text—notably, the love of the governess and the apparitions of 
Quint and Jessel—which constantly defer to one another. Indeed, by virtue of his or her 
attempt at interpretation and the paralysis that is engendered by the text’s ambiguity, the 
reader too finds himself in this circuitous loop—a “fighter” himself in the ring, unable to 
say with any certainty what The Turn of The Screw is really about. We can only perhaps 
say that it demonstrates this linguistic conundrum that is both the text’s meaning and the 
negation of its meaning. 
 In order to tie this allegory of linguistic uncertainty together, we must look to the 
ending of the tale, which seems to confirm the story as a struggle of language to remain 
free, fluid and plural in the face of the interpretative necessity of objective signification. 
As a preface to this ending, it might be helpful to look back to the most recent quotation 
that I have used from the text—however, this time including the ellipsed content. 
I suppose I now read into our situation a clearness it couldn’t have had at 
the time, for I seem to see our poor eyes already lighted with some spark 
of a prevision of the anguish that was to come. So we circled about with 
terrors and scruples, fighters not daring to close.73 
 
In her futur antérieur construction, the governess alludes clearly to the ending of the tale, 
in which Miles is smothered to death. The fact that this warning comes just before her 
attempted forced confession, which fails in her acknowledgment of “the possibilities of a 
beautiful discourse,” seems to tell us that the end of the tale itself is commenting on this 
linguistic dialectic of fixed, objective and fluid, plural language. The clarity that she now 
perceives, though only in retrospect, seems to indicate an understanding of the violence 
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that is linked with this act of forced confession and, indeed, with the reduction of 
language to a mere literal status.  
Let us look to the scene of the boy’s death itself. The passage occurs when the 
apparition of Peter Quint emerges outside a nearby window and the governess determines 
to wrest a confession from the boy.  
“…[governess speaking] It’s there—the coward horror, there for 
the last time!” 
At this, after a second in which his head made the movement of a baffled 
dog’s on a scent and then gave a frantic little shake for air and light, he 
was at me in a white rage, bewildered, glaring vainly over the place and 
missing wholly, though it now, to my sense, filled the room like the taste 
of posion, the wide overwhelming presence. 
‘It’s he?’ 
I was so determined to have all my proof that I flashed into ice74 to 
challenged him. ‘Whom do you mean by “he”?’ 
‘Peter Quint—you devil!’ His face gave again, round the room, its 
convulsed supplication. ‘Where?’ 
They are in my ears still, his supreme surrender of the name and his tribute 
to my devotion.75 
 
In equating the boy’s questions (“It’s he?” and “where”) with a confession—with the 
literal status of the name, Peter Quint—the governess seems to fall victim to the 
hermeneutical trap of the text. Like Wilson, who finds certainty in the decided ambiguity 
of the governess’s love, the governess has found certainty in the ambiguity of the boy’s 
interrogatives.  Though she seems to be declaring her victory, and the exorcism of the 
ghosts, we will see that her interpretative mistake—the equating of the literal and the 
ambiguously plural—will prove fatal. 
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I caught him, yes, I held him—it may be imagined with what a passion; 
but at the end of a minute I began to feel what it truly was that I held. We 
were alone with the quiet day, and his little heart, dispossessed had 
stopped.76 
 
If the death of the boy is synonymous with the smothering of language (“the 
possibilities of beautiful discourse”) by virtue of its literalization and unwarranted 
reduction, then what is it, specifically, that makes this process “vulgar” in James’ eyes.  
Early on in her article Felman sums up this relation neatly, delineating with precision the 
linguistic—and indeed aesthetic dilemma of literal, objective language: 
The literal is vulgar because it stops the movement constitutive of 
meaning, because it blocks and interrupts the endless process of 
metaphorical substitution. The vulgar, therefore is anything that misses, or 
falls short of, the dimension, anything that rules out, or excludes, meaning 
as a loss and as flight—anything that strives, or in other words, to 
eliminate from language its inherent silence, anything that misses the 
specific way in which a text actively won’t tell.77 
 
The importance of polysemy, of fluidity and ambiguity in language, seems to be 
necessary for the preservation of its rhetorical possibilities, which might resist the 
stagnation and the commodification of language as a mere linguistic currency. For James 
it seems that the effect of this type of ontological difficulty was that it lent his tale the 
lurid and uncanny uncertainty for which he strived—that which was necessary to imbue 
the suspense and horror of his ghost story. Yet, there is certainly something to be said 
about the aesthetic of this sort of language that resists the reader’s comprehension. If it 
were in fact devoid of value, why would poets such Mallarmé or Celan have written at 
all? Furthermore, does the notion of ontological difficulty bear a mimetic appeal in the 
representation of the depths of consciousness and the idea of exformation—that 
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information, which comprises an idea, though remains incommunicable via language? 
These are all questions to consider in considering the limits of semiotic language and 
their exploration in the modern narratives of the 19th and 20th century (we must expand 
out timetable to include James’ works here). Yet, what seems certain, at least likely, is 
that James’ Turn of the Screw is more than simply a thrilling ghost story; it is a 
commentary on the very linguistic means which he used to elaborate his meaning, and at 
that, a masterful prefiguring of the modern literature and the skepticism concerning 
language and interpretation that would emerge early in the 20th century.  
 
 
Overturning Literary Precedent:  
The Verdict 
As a brief Segue into Modern literature, it might be said that the 19th Century 
gave rise to a literature that attempted the faithful representation of reality, simply as it 
is—unobstructed by the subjective lens of an individual’s observation. Realist writers 
such as Gustave Flaubert or Emile Zola have taken this tactic to great extents in their 
drawn out descriptions of flora, fauna, man and society, going so far as to devote nearly 
half a page to the description of an empty field or the incongruous elements of a 
schoolboy’s cap. As another general example, take Balzac’s introduction to Eugénie 
Grandet:  
In some country towns there are houses more depressing to the sight than 
the dimmest cloister, the most melancholy ruins, or the dreariest stretch of 
sandy waste. Perhaps such houses as these combine the characteristics of 
all the three, and to the dumb silence of the monastery they unite the 
gauntness and the grimness of the ruin, and the arid desolation of the 
waste. So little sign is there of life or of movement about them, that a 
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stranger might take them for uninhabited dwellings; but the sound of an 
unfamiliar footstep brings someone to the window, a passive face 
suddenly appears above the sill, and the traveler receives a listless and 
indifferent glance—it is almost as if a monk leaned out to look for a 
moment on the world.78 
 
The objectivity of this ontological realm is derived, in part, by its static elements, its 
emptiness and “arid desolation”; it appears as a scene frozen in time. In this incipit to 
Balzac’s text there appears to be a rudimentary allegory of reading that is similar in some 
respects to those we have examined in the previous chapters. The seemingly empty 
“dwellings” of the text could be read as agents in a metaphor for the impartial and 
detached language that is bereft of (“uninhabited” by) subjective or authorial sentiment 
(“so little sign is there of life or of movement about them”). The reader’s entrance into 
this barren world is marked by the “traveler”—a stranger to this desolate land. His 
relation to the text is one of inaction as hinted at by “the listless and indifference glance” 
he receives from the only exterior sign of life, “a passive face.” It is within this relation 
between the reader and this text that a “dumb silence” governs. 
If the literary agenda of authors such as Balzac and Flaubert was to capture and 
arrest the superficial surfaces of an external world and to petrify language to this end, it 
could be argued that modernism veered in the opposite direction. The subject of authors 
like Proust, Kafka and James constitutes, generally, a turning inward and an attempt to 
depict “not an echo from without, but the resonance of a vibration from within.”79 It is by 
virtue of this subject—the inner world of consciousness and the movement of its 
vibrations—that an instability of perception is engendered in works by Proust, Kafka and 
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James. This is, effectively, the mobility entailed by Proust’s revelation, quoted before, 
that “the immobility of things that surround us is forced upon them by our conviction that 
they are themselves and not anything else, by the immobility of our conception of 
them.”80 
 The transference of this movement into linguistic realms seems to be linked to the 
notion of ontological difficulty, as expressed by Steiner. The symptom—the text’s 
irreducibility by virtue of its inherent multiplicity of meaning—might then be linked with 
the “ancient trope of inadequate discourse,” which I have previously cited. That is (to 
recount), the inability of language to arrest the impermeable singularity and the fluid 
movement of consciousness and perception. It would be appropriate then to equate this 
seemingly inevitable difficulty (as it pertains to the Modern’s subject) with Walter 
Benjamin’s pessimistic conclusion on Kafka. In a longer estimation of the Czech author’s 
work, the critic writes,  
This document [the letter to Brod, in which insists that his writings be 
burned], which no one interested in Kafka can disregard, says that the 
writings did not satisfy their author, that he regarded his efforts as failures, 
that he counted himself among those who were bound to fail. He did fail 
in his grandiose attempt to convert poetry into doctrine, to turn it into a 
parable and restore it to that stability and unpretentiousness which, in the 
face of reason, seemed to him to be the only appropriate thing for it. No 
other writer has obeyed the commandment "Thou shalt not make unto thee 
a graven image" so faithfully.81 
 
In this view, it is Kafka’s sensibility to the incompatibility of language and experience—
the idolatry inherent in representation—that dooms his struggle to failure. Thus, 
Benjamin’s conclusion reduces Kafka’s work to a striving towards an inaccessible 
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absolute and a summation of the very linguistic predicament that precludes any 
possibility of the text’s truth or success. Such a failure, beautiful as it may be, is entailed 
by the author’s inability to raise language to the level of truth or, in other words, the 
inability of literature to be synonymous with the meaning it seeks. 
 However, there is perhaps another more redeeming effect, engendered by 
ontological difficulty, which Benjamin has ignored. Consider the following quotation 
from Michel de Certeau’s L’Ecriture de l’Histoire, and the significative implications that 
might be drawn from it. 
Writing is born from and deals with acknowledged doubt of an explicit 
division, in sum, of the impossibility of one's own place. It articulates an 
act that is constantly a beginning: the subject is never authorized by a 
place, it could never install itself in an inalterable cogito, it remains a 
stranger to itself and forever deprived of an ontological ground, and 
therefore it always comes up short or is in excess, always the debtor of a 
death, indebted with respect to the disappearance of a genealogical and 
territorial "substance," linked to a name that cannot be owned.82 
 
Though there is perhaps a pessimistic tone to the passage, it also entails an emancipation 
of meaning from its linguistic bonds. Benjamin’s mistake might then be that he attempts 
to “own” the language and the meaning of Kafka’s work. In proclaiming the author’s 
failure he latches onto the way that meanings “comes up short,” though ignores the way 
in which, its uncertain “ontological ground” breeds its “excess”—the way in which a 
plurality of meaning can be unlocked from language’s “reserves of silence”, from an 
author’s aversion to literal signification and from the way in which “the text actively 
won’t tell.”83 This shortsightedness of his parochial approach to meaning is exactly the 
logical failing of Joseph K. in The Trial, or the unnamed narrator of The Turn of the 
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Screw, and of the countless critics who have proffered an objectively assured reading of 
either of these texts. 
 As the priest in the cathedral suggests that it is a modification of perspective that 
can allow Joseph K. to understand his legal predicament, it is the same with Kafka’s 
reader. If we apply this discursive interpretative philosophy of Kafka’s priest—one that 
allows for the cohabitation of multiple meanings within Kafka’s parables, instead of the 
obliteration of one before the other—Kafka’s texts might just be emancipated from what, 
at one point, seemed to be their inevitable failure. Yet, this shift in perspective is merely 
what allows the true genius of Kafka’s work to be recognized. The true redeeming aspect 
of ambiguity and the polysemy of interpretation it engenders, instead, has to do with its 
construction. Gilles Deleuze compares Kafka’s peculiar modern style to a machine, 
geared to create an effect.84 This effect, not remarkable in itself, is the constitutive 
capacity of the author’s text to generate connections—it is a catalyst for the building of 
associations, and for a whole myriad range of interpretative possibilities that spring up in 
the reader’s mind. 85 
What is truly remarkable is that this generative and associative effect seems to be 
linked to a subject that is indeed intrinsic to modernist literature—the fluidity and 
constant movement of consciousness and perception that in Proust we have deemed 
temporal layers. Though, in this case, given that Kafka has little mention of temporality 
in his works (with the exception of Before The Law), we might instead refer to this 
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phenomenon as perspectival layers. It is in the fluid and discursive polysemic 
interpretations engendered by Kafka’s ambiguity that one would perceive this flux of 
consciousness and malleability of perception that is a key revelation in Proust’s 
understanding of the self and its relation to the world.  
We should note that, while Proust illustrates this process in the mutability of his 
subjects, Kafka has a far more ambitious task in mind. His texts (when paired with a 
reader) literally enact this process in their generation of fluid interpretative possibilities. 
Kafka’s texts, thus, function as a sort of generative mirror for Proustian consciousness in 
the way that they allow, and truly, encourage associations to latch onto them—to build 
themselves into the text’s meaning in the same way that Proustain consciousness laces 
itself into the objects it perceives. Better yet (and in keeping with Proust’s metaphor of 
iridescent light and the color spectrum) we should liken Kafka’s machinic effect to that of 
a prism—one that filters the readers gaze and his consciousness, refracting it in multiple 
directions. It is this catalytic capacity inherent in polysemy and its mimetic appeal to 
conscious perception that appears to be the source of language’s power and of its 
“possibilities of beautiful discourse” for modernists such as Kafka, James or Proust. 
Therefore, the reason then why Kafka may have seen himself as a failure—why 
he would have insisted that his work be burned upon his death—may have to do with 
something else entirely. Consider these two separate quotes from John Updike’s foreword 
to Franz Kafka: The Complete Stories: 
The century since Franz Kafka was born has been marked by the idea of 
“modernism”—a self consciousness new among centuries, a 
consciousness of being new.86 
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Kafka felt bashed before the fact of his own existence, “amateurish” in 
that this had never been quite expressed before. So singular, he spoke for 
millions in their new unease…he seems the last holy writer, and the 
supreme fabulist of modern man’s cosmic predicament.87 
 
Updike gets it only half right. It seems undeniable that Kafka’s angst about failure is 
related to the singularity and newness of his expression (“that this had never been quite 
expressed before”). Yet, the truly novel aspect of his expression is not what Updike 
eloquently deems as “modern man’s cosmic predicament.” Instead, it would seem that it 
is something more like the modern author’s expressive predicament. Kafka was aware 
that the literature he was writing was unlike anything that had been produced before (with 
the partial exception of Henry James). His qualms about failure, and about his critics and 
readers inability to grasp the meaning of his work are related to the fact that his mode of 
expression—his polysemically fueled associative machine— was a supremely novel and 
thus “amateuristic” expressive mode. It is this that prompts Deleuze’s conclusion that 
Kafka’s works could not be considered literature in the (then) contemporary sense; they 
required an entirely new set of interpretative guidelines—guidelines that roughly fit the 
discursive hermeneutical and perspectival approach of the priest—in order to wrest the 
true potential of their unique expression.  
The tentative tone that Kafka takes in his own work—and in his writings about his 
work—suggests that he understood that he was, in a sense, overturning the parochial 
paradigm of interpretation that standard literature necessitated. He had likely been well 
informed of Nietzsche’s philosophy that 
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Expression must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings. 
When a form is broken, one must reconstruct the content that will 
necessarily be part of a rupture in the order of things. To take over, to 
anticipate, the material.88 
 
It is in his text, The Penal Colony, that Kafka seems to suggest the necessity to shatter 
traditional forms of expression, in order to express the modern content of his works.89 
This story has been interpreted in a myriad of ways and exemplifies the way in which 
Kafka’s associative effect functions. Many have noted that it suggests a religious allegory 
concerning the overturning of the unsympathetic law of the Old Testament. Equally, 
critics have noted that it can be read as an allegory of the Dreyfus case, which received 
immense amounts of attention around the time of Kafka’s authorship. Yet, another 
reading of the text would suggest the way in which Kafka saw himself as overturning 
literary precedent. If the Old commandant and his elaborate torture machine, “the 
harrow”, represented a pre-modern literary tradition, then the new commandant may be 
seen as the harbinger of modern expression. The impartial explorer, who is given the 
responsibility of judging the efficacy of this punitive process, could be seen as Kafka’s 
reader, with whom the final judgment lies. 
 We observe that “the harrow” is in poor shape; it is breaking down and needs 
replacement parts, as if to suggest the increasing inadequacy of this system. Additionally, 
we note that guilt is assumed in each case, as if to suggest the way in which pre-modern 
literature assumes hermeneutical interpretation as a valid means of deconstructing a text. 
Finally, one should also note that the punishment, meted out by the harrow, involves the 
literal ascription of a crime—of which one is assumed but never proven guilty—onto the 
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flesh of prisoners. This would seem to be the failure of the realists in assuming the an 
ontological link between language and that which it describes as well as the failure of 
traditional literary theory, which would suggest that the literature—as literature—must be 
susceptible to interpretative certainty. The breaking down of the harrow at the end of the 
story the narrates the way in which Kafka has broken this traditional form and the way in 
which his typically modern expressive mode both confounds and overturns literary 
precedent. 
 The beauty and the genius of Kafka’s hybrid form, however, is that it weaves into 
itself the epistemological dialogue by which its this mode of expression comes to exist.  
We have seen in the dialectical movement of The Trees, in the polysemy suggested by the 
double meaning of erträumen, and in the reversal of the text/reader relationship that is 
entailed Before The Law, that the associations built into his text are not merely 
haphazard; They often narrate the process, in which this polysemical signification occurs, 
and in the case of The Penal Colony (and even of Before The Law), they narrate the way 
in which this modern expression confounds traditional hermeneutical processes and, thus, 
the way in which a new form of literature emerges.  
It is by this token that Kafka’s texts are not just an allegorical expression of its 
novel significative capacity, but are also, themselves, the expression. In other words, 
(returning to the culminating question at which we have left the first chapter) Kafka has 
managed the raise the polysemy of the text to the lofty and paradoxical height of an 
objective signification—he has created an exquisite purity in a literature (a signifier) that 
signifies itself. It is in this sense that the author achieves the seemingly impossible and 
truly remarkable goal of raising the representation to the level of the represented—
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flattening the distance between the two and making one synonymous and 
indistinguishable from the other. The verdict is in and Kafka may rest assuredly. The 
same, however, should not be said of his plaintiff, Walter Benjamin. 
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